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Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole 
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment 
SARAH FRENCH RUSSELL* 
State parole boards have historically operated free from constitutional constraints 
when making decisions about whether to release prisoners. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions subject states to a new constitutional requirement to provide a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release” for at least some categories of juvenile offenders. 
Using original data collected through a survey, this Article provides the first 
comprehensive description of existing parole board release procedures nationwide 
and explores whether these practices comply with the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
mandate. 
The Court’s recent decisions in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama prohibit 
sentences of life without the possibility of release (LWOP) for juvenile offenders in 
nonhomicide cases and forbid mandatory LWOP sentences in homicide cases. States 
must now provide nonhomicide juvenile offenders with a “meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release” and give judges the option of imposing a sentence with the chance of 
release on homicide offenders. Around the country, state courts, legislatures, and 
governors have started to respond to Graham and Miller. Yet there is little 
scholarship focusing on a central issue raised by these cases: What constitutes a 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release under the Eighth Amendment? The Court 
has declined to provide detailed guidance on the matter, stating that “[i]t is for the 
State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.” 
Viewed in the context of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
meaningful opportunity for release requirement appears to encompass three distinct 
components: (1) a chance of release at a meaningful point in time, (2) a realistic 
likelihood of release for the rehabilitated, and (3) a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. For the most part, states have responded to Graham and Miller by making 
juvenile offenders eligible for release under existing and long-standing parole board 
procedures. To date, the debate in the states has focused primarily on the first 
component of the meaningful opportunity requirement—when a juvenile offender 
should be eligible for release. Most states have paid little attention to whether 
existing parole board practices satisfy the other two components of the meaningful 
opportunity requirement. These practices, which were designed for a different 
purpose, may not offer a realistic chance of release and meaningful hearings for 
juvenile offenders. 
Parole procedures in every state are different, and many parole boards operate 
under unwritten and unpublished rules. To understand existing practices, I sent a 
survey to every parole board in the country. The survey results revealed procedures 
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that, while adequate for adult offenders, may not survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny 
when applied to juvenile offenders under Graham and Miller. Such procedures 
include (1) preventing prisoners from appearing before decision makers, (2) denying 
prisoners the right to see and rebut evidence, and (3) limiting the role of counsel. I 
conclude that some states may not be able to rely on their existing parole board 
practices to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, and may need to craft 
special rules for considering release of juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida1 that imposing a 
sentence of life without the possibility of release (LWOP) on juvenile offenders in 
nonhomicide cases violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. In such cases, states must now provide incarcerated juvenile offenders 
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.”2 Two years later, Miller v. Alabama3 held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for juvenile 
offenders—regardless of the severity of the crime. Instead, juvenile homicide 
offenders facing possible life sentences are entitled to “individualized sentencing,” 
and judges must have the option of imposing a sentence that allows a meaningful 
possibility of release.4 Indeed, the Court emphasized that appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP “will be uncommon.”5 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2030. 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 4. Id. at 2460, 2469. 
 5. Id. at 2469. 
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Although Graham has received considerable scholarly attention,6 there is little 
scholarship focusing on a central issue: What constitutes a “meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release”?7 The Supreme Court has declined to provide detailed guidance 
on this question, stating that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the 
means and mechanisms for compliance.”8 
In the wake of Graham and Miller, juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences 
have challenged their sentences in court, and judges have started to craft remedies.9 
In addition, state legislatures and governors are considering and adopting a range of 
possible responses to the Supreme Court decisions.10 Viewed in the context of the 
Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it appears that Graham’s 
requirement that states provide a meaningful opportunity for release encompasses 
three distinct components: (1) individuals must have a chance of release at a 
meaningful point in time, (2) rehabilitated prisoners must have a realistic likelihood 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer 
Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010); Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: 
Graham v. Florida and the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011); William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different 
Than Death: The Argument for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category of 
Heightened Review Under the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1109 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); Richard 
S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—And Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010); Kristin Henning, 
Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism 
in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17 (2012); Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively 
Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 62 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, 
Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011); 
Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 (2010); 
Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: Graham v. Florida and 
the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 
327; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme 
Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010); Aaron Sussman, 
The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 VT. L. REV. 381 
(2012). 
 7. Several articles have addressed this issue to some degree but have a different focus 
from the present Article. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide 
a Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 
24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310 (2012); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release 
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011). Glynn and Vila argue that state incarceration policies 
currently impede the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. In addition, the authors argue that 
states without parole systems must develop new release mechanisms, and they offer a model 
statute for reducing sentences for juvenile offenders. Glynn & Vila, supra, at 333–46. 
Green’s article argues that under Graham states must return to rehabilitative models of 
incarceration of juvenile offenders, and adopt a prison release mechanism that assesses “the 
individual juvenile life sentence offender’s success in attaining growth with a focus on the 
psychology of human conduct.” Green, supra, at 34. 
 8. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.B–C. 
376 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:373 
 
of being released, and (3) the parole board or other releasing authority must employ 
procedures that allow an individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard.11 As 
states respond to Graham and Miller, questions emerge about the scope of each of 
these three components of the meaningful opportunity requirement.  
First, a meaningful opportunity for release implies that the chance of release 
must come at a meaningful point in time in the offender’s life. But when precisely 
during the course of a prisoner’s incarceration must states provide this opportunity? 
Is one chance at release enough, or must states provide periodic review of 
sentences? Second, it is apparent under Graham that to be “meaningful,” the 
chance of release for rehabilitated prisoners must be “realistic.” Yet Graham does 
not say more about how likely states must make the possibility of release and 
provides little guidance on the criteria that states should use in assessing whether to 
grant release. Finally, to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, states must 
give meaningful consideration to a prisoner’s suitability for release. But what 
constitutes meaningful consideration? Do existing parole procedures fulfill this 
mandate, or does Graham require parole boards to employ new procedures to 
ensure that juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity to be heard? Do 
procedural requirements for hearings stem from the Eighth Amendment, or does 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analysis govern?12  
Following Graham and Miller, most of the remedies created by courts and 
considered and enacted by legislatures involve simply making juvenile offenders 
eligible for parole under existing state parole practices.13 Courts and legislatures 
have focused primarily on the timing of eligibility for release, but they have paid 
relatively little attention to whether parole boards will offer a realistic chance of 
release to these juvenile offenders and whether existing state parole procedures will 
actually provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.14 
Many parole boards follow unwritten and unpublished rules on significant 
matters, and information about the processes currently in place in the fifty states 
has not been compiled elsewhere.15 To fill this void, I sent a survey to every parole 
board in the country. Using the survey results, this Article presents the first 
comprehensive description and analysis of parole release procedures nationwide. It 
is apparent from an examination of these procedures that simply making a juvenile 
offender eligible for parole may not ensure that the opportunity for release is truly 
meaningful. Rather, important features are missing from existing parole release 
processes in many states—features that are needed to ensure meaningful hearings 
for juvenile offenders.16 For example, many state parole boards do not allow 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Few scholars have considered procedural aspects of the Graham decision. Notable 
exceptions are Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring 
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 398 (2013), and Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality 
and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). These articles are discussed further infra notes 
266–268 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II; see also Drinan, supra note 6, at 77–82 (offering suggestions for 
state legislative responses prior to Miller). 
 15. See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
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prisoners to appear in person before the decision makers, deny prisoners the right to 
see and rebut significant information relied upon by the board in rendering a 
decision, and strictly limit the involvement of the prisoner’s attorney.17 If states are 
going to rely on their parole boards to provide a meaningful opportunity for release 
under the Eighth Amendment, many may need to craft special rules for boards to 
use when considering release for juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences. 
In responding to Graham and Miller, states need to move beyond simply 
considering when to make juvenile offenders eligible for release. They must also 
consider how to provide meaningful hearings and a realistic chance of release for 
rehabilitated offenders. Significantly, the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s 
meaningful opportunity requirement is relevant not only in states that have imposed 
LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases (in violation of 
Graham) and in states that mandate LWOP for certain offenses (in violation of 
Miller). Rather, even states that impose sentences of life with the possibility of 
parole on juvenile offenders must ensure that their parole processes in fact provide 
prisoners with a meaningful opportunity for release. If the chance of release is not 
meaningful under a state’s existing parole system, then a sentence of life with 
parole is equivalent to an LWOP sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes. Thus, 
all states around the country must take a close look at whether their parole systems 
are operating consistently with new constitutional requirements. 
Part I of the Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and 
Miller and examines the relevance of release opportunities in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part II describes the responses by courts and state legislatures to 
Graham and Miller, which for the most part have involved simply making juvenile 
offenders eligible for parole under existing state parole systems. Part III presents 
the results of a comprehensive survey of procedures currently used by parole 
boards nationwide. Part IV considers the scope of Graham’s mandate to the states 
and explores whether state responses are complying with Eighth Amendment 
requirements. The Article concludes with suggestions for reforms to existing parole 
practices in cases involving juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences. 
I. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA, MILLER V. ALABAMA, AND THE CHANCE OF RELEASE 
A. The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Offenders 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has placed new limits on the types of 
sentences that may be imposed on individuals who commit crimes under the age of 
eighteen. In 2005, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons18 that the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits capital punishment 
for juvenile offenders because of their lessened culpability.19 Five years later, in 
Graham v. Florida, the Court held that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose 
a sentence of life without the possibility of release on some categories of juvenile 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
 18. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 569–71. 
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offenders.20 At least in nonhomicide cases, states must provide incarcerated 
juvenile offenders with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”21  
Relying on Roper, the Graham Court noted that “[a]s compared to adults, 
juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; 
they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’”22 
Moreover, “[t]hese salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.’”23 
The idea that juveniles are capable of rehabilitation was central to the Court’s 
analysis in Graham. The Court emphasized that “[j]uveniles are more capable of 
change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 
‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.”24 The Court 
reasoned that a sentence of life without the possibility of release “forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal”25 and “deprives the convict of the most basic 
liberties without giving hope of restoration.”26 “By denying the defendant the right 
to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that 
person’s value and place in society.”27 However, “[t]his judgment is not appropriate 
in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral 
culpability.”28 The Court emphasized: “The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose 
the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before 
adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the 
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”29 
 The Court thus held that a state “is not required to guarantee eventual freedom 
to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime” but must “give 
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”30 The Court declined to provide 
guidance on the details of this requirement, stating that “[i]t is for the State, in the 
first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”31 However, 
the Court rejected executive clemency as a sufficient mechanism for compliance, 
noting that this “remote possibility . . . does not mitigate the harshness of the 
sentence.”32 The Court concluded that if a state “imposes a sentence of life it must 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 21. Id. at 2030. 
 22. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (alteration in original)). 
 23. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). 
 24. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
 25. Id. at 2030. 
 26. Id. at 2027. 
 27. Id. at 2030. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2027. 
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provide [the prisoner] with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the 
end of that term.”33 
Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that the Court’s decision invited “a host of 
line-drawing problems to which courts must seek answers beyond the strictures of 
the Constitution.”34 In particular, the dissent noted: 
The Court holds that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” but 
must provide the offender with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” But what, 
exactly, does such a “meaningful” opportunity entail? When must it 
occur? And what Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by 
the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The 
Court provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt 
embroil the courts for years.35 
Two years after Graham, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama that a sentencing 
scheme that mandates a sentence of life without the possibility of release upon 
conviction of an offense violates the Eighth Amendment when applied to 
individuals who committed crimes when they were under the age of eighteen.36 
Even in the most serious homicide cases, juvenile offenders are entitled to 
“individualized sentencing” under the Eighth Amendment, and judges must have 
discretion to impose a sentence that allows a meaningful opportunity for release 
later in time.37 
As in Graham, the Court in Miller emphasized the capacity of children to 
rehabilitate. The Court reasoned that children have “greater prospects for reform”38 
than adults and observed that mandatory LWOP “disregards the possibility of 
rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”39 Miller does not on 
its face prevent a sentence of life without release for homicide offenders. However, 
the Court noted that “given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision 
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we 
think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible 
penalty will be uncommon.”40 The Court stated that this is “especially so because 
of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early 
age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.’”41 The Court concluded: “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s 
ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Id. at 2034. 
 34. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. (citation omitted).  
 36. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 37. Id. at 2460, 2469. 
 38. Id. at 2464. 
 39. Id. at 2468. 
 40. Id. at 2469. 
 41. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
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how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”42  
Thus, after Graham, a judge may not decide at the time of sentencing in a 
nonhomicide case to imprison a child for life. Instead, if a life sentence is imposed, 
it must be indeterminate: there must be a second look—and a “realistic” and 
“meaningful” opportunity for the individual to be released based on demonstrated 
rehabilitation.43 In addition, under Miller, in homicide cases, sentencing courts 
must at least have the option of imposing a sentence that provides a meaningful 
opportunity for release.44  
Graham and Miller give little guidance to states about the scope of the 
requirement that states provide “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” The 
Court had not used this phrase previously in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and 
the phrase did not appear in the briefing in Graham. Rather, it appears that the term 
was first used during oral argument in Graham, when counsel for Graham asserted 
that he was asking for states to provide “a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent 
offender to demonstrate that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit to live 
in society.”45 As Justice Thomas anticipated in his Graham dissent,46 states are now 
confronted with various questions about how to comply with the meaningful 
opportunity requirement. 
B. The Relationship Between the Eighth Amendment  
and an Opportunity for Release 
Although Graham and Miller provide little guidance about what a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release” entails, clues regarding the significance of this 
phrase appear in some of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment decisions. 
Before Graham and Miller, the Supreme Court had not applied categorical bans 
on sentences of imprisonment under the Eighth Amendment and thus had not made 
the possibility of release a component of a categorical rule.47 Rather, the Court had 
applied categorical bans on sentences only in capital cases.48 However, in 
considering whether individual sentences for adult offenders withstood Eighth 
Amendment proportionality scrutiny under the particular case circumstances, the 
Court had previously noted that the possibility of release is relevant to the Eighth 
Amendment analysis. 
For example, in 1980, in Rummel v. Estelle,49 the Court found that the 
availability of parole in the sentence under review weighed against finding an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2034 (2010). 
 44. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2469.  
 45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 46. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 47. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (noting that categorical restrictions were applied 
previously only in death penalty cases); see Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 336–53 
(discussing the evolution of the Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical analysis). 
 48. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 49. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
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Eighth Amendment violation. In Rummel, the Court upheld a mandatory life 
sentence imposed on a defendant under a recidivist statute after his third felony 
conviction. 50 There, the Court emphasized that the prisoner was eligible for parole 
after serving twelve years.51 The Court agreed with the prisoner that “his inability 
to enforce any ‘right’ to parole precludes us from treating his life sentence as if it 
were equivalent to a sentence of 12 years.”52 However, “because parole is ‘an 
established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals,’ . . . a proper 
assessment of Texas’ treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that 
he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life.”53 The Court noted that 
“[i]f nothing else, the possibility of parole, however slim, serves to distinguish 
Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist statute like Mississippi’s, 
which provides for a sentence of life without parole upon conviction of three 
felonies including at least one violent felony.”54 
In contrast, several years later in Solem v. Helm,55 the Court held that a sentence 
of life without the possibility of release was unconstitutional under the specific 
circumstances of the case: the offender’s sentence was imposed for a conviction of 
uttering a “no account” check for $100, and his prior convictions were for 
nonviolent and “relatively minor” offenses.56 In Solem, the Court emphasized that, 
barring executive clemency, the prisoner “will spend the rest of his life in the state 
penitentiary.”57 The Court reasoned: “This sentence is far more severe than the life 
sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was likely to have been 
eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial confinement, a fact on which the 
Court relied heavily.”58 
Although Rummel noted that “the possibility of parole, however slim, serve[d] 
to distinguish Rummel” from those sentenced to life without the chance of parole,59 
Solem makes clear that the actual likelihood of release is relevant to the Eighth 
Amendment analysis. Although, in theory, the prisoner in Solem could have been 
released by executive clemency, the Court concluded that this possibility did not 
sufficiently mitigate the sentence given that clemency grants are unpredictable and 
rarely granted. 
The Court in Solem observed that the South Dakota commutation system 
available to the prisoner was “fundamentally different from the parole system that 
was before [the Court] in Rummel.”60 The Court noted that “[a]s a matter of law, 
parole and commutation are different concepts, despite some surface similarities.”61 
In particular, “[p]arole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process,” and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Id. at 264–65. 
 51. Id. at 280–81. 
 52. Id. at 280. 
 53. Id. at 280–81 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)). 
 54. Id. at 281. 
 55. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 56. Id. at 279–84.  
 57. Id. at 297. 
 58. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 59. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281. 
 60. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.  
 61. Id. 
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“[a]ssuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of 
cases.”62 Moreover, because “[t]he law generally specifies when a prisoner will be 
eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures 
applicable at that time[,] . . . it is possible to predict, at least to some extent, when 
parole might be granted.”63 In contrast, commutation “is an ad hoc exercise of 
executive clemency[, and a] Governor may commute a sentence at any time for any 
reason without reference to any standards.”64 
After noting these general differences between clemency and parole, the Solem 
Court examined the particular characteristics of the clemency and parole processes 
in the states at issue to assess the actual likelihood of release through these systems. 
The Court noted that the “Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are very 
different,”65 and “[i]n Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the existence of 
some system of parole”66 but “[r]ather it looked to the provisions of the system 
presented, including the fact that Texas had ‘a relatively liberal policy of granting 
“good time” credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner 
serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little as 12 years.’”67 In 
contrast, in South Dakota, no life sentence had been commuted in more than eight 
years.68 Moreover, the Court reasoned that “even if Helm’s sentence were 
commuted, he merely would be eligible to be considered for parole,” and “[n]ot 
only is there no guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel.”69 
The Court again highlighted the relevance of release to Eighth Amendment 
analysis in 2003 in Ewing v. California,70 where it upheld application of 
California’s “three strikes” law to an individual convicted of felony grand theft for 
stealing three golf clubs. There, the defendant was sentenced to life with the 
possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years.71 In declining to find an Eighth 
Amendment violation, the Court contrasted the sentence to one that did not allow 
the possibility of release.72 
 In sum, Supreme Court cases prior to Graham recognized that the availability 
of release is relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed, Graham relied on 
Rummel and Solem in emphasizing the “severity of sentences that deny convicts the 
possibility of parole” and in rejecting executive clemency as an adequate 
mechanism for providing a meaningful opportunity for release.73 Rummel and 
Solem reveal that courts must look beyond the mere technical availability of a 
release mechanism and examine how procedures actually operate in the specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 300–01. 
 64. Id. at 301. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980)).  
 68. Id. at 302. 
 69. Id. at 302–03. 
 70. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).  
 71. Id. at 20. 
 72. See id. at 22. 
 73. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
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state at issue. Central to the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis in these cases was 
the timing of the opportunity for release, the standards governing the release 
decision, and the actual likelihood of release. 
These same matters considered in Solem and Rummel are relevant in 
determining whether states are in compliance with Graham. Viewed in the context 
of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it is apparent that 
Graham’s requirement that states provide a meaningful opportunity for release 
encompasses three distinct components: (1) individuals must have a chance of 
release at a meaningful point in time, (2) rehabilitated prisoners must have a 
realistic likelihood of being released, and (3) the parole board or other releasing 
authority must employ procedures that allow an individual a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. As discussed further below, as states respond to Graham 
and Miller, significant questions emerge about the scope of each of these 
components of the meaningful opportunity requirement. Before exploring the scope 
of Graham’s mandate, I consider initial responses by states around the country to 
Graham and Miller. 
II. STATE RESPONSES TO GRAHAM AND MILLER 
Nationwide, state courts, legislatures, and governors are responding to the 
Graham and Miller decisions. For the most part, debate has centered on the issue of 
when states should make juvenile offenders eligible for release. Thus far, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the criteria and procedures that parole boards or 
other releasing authorities should use in assessing a prisoner’s suitability for 
release. Below, I examine state responses to Graham and Miller. 
A. Responses by the Courts 
Following Graham and Miller, a number of juvenile offenders serving LWOP or 
otherwise lengthy sentences have sought relief from courts. As the discussion 
below demonstrates, case law has focused primarily on when prisoners should 
become eligible for release, and there has been little litigation yet about the criteria 
and procedures that states should use when considering the suitability of prisoners 
for release. 
Timing issues have arisen when appellate courts have granted relief to prisoners 
serving LWOP sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. Some of these 
decisions have converted LWOP sentences to life-with-parole sentences and either 
have specified a particular time for parole eligibility or have left this timing 
question for the sentencing court to determine at resentencing.74 For example, in 
responding to claims of unconstitutional sentences in nonhomicide cases, courts in 
Louisiana and Iowa converted LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the 
possibility of parole. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the appropriate 
remedy under Graham was to delete the parole eligibility restriction on a life 
sentence, which made the prisoner eligible for parole after serving twenty years in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
384 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:373 
 
prison and reaching the age of forty-five.75 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court held 
that Graham required severance of the no-parole restriction on an LWOP 
sentence.76 This made the prisoner immediately eligible for parole consideration 
under the standard Iowa parole statute.77 The Louisiana and Iowa courts did not 
give any special direction to the parole board about the nature of the hearing that it 
should ultimately provide to the prisoners. 
Several courts have taken a similar approach in responding to Miller claims in 
homicide cases and have converted LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the 
chance of parole after a set number of years.78 For example, in Colorado, an 
appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s mandatory LWOP sentence was 
unconstitutional under Miller and that the appropriate penalty was the most serious 
statutorily authorized penalty that was constitutionally permissible—life 
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after forty years.79 In Massachusetts, 
two trial courts have held post-Miller that mandatory LWOP sentences for first-
degree murder are unconstitutional, and individuals must instead be sentenced 
pursuant to the second-degree murder statute, which provides a life sentence with 
the possibility of parole after fifteen years.80 
Some appellate courts responding to Miller claims have remanded LWOP cases 
for resentencing and noted that courts may reimpose LWOP sentences if they first 
consider the relevant mitigating factors. Some of these courts have remanded 
without establishing an acceptable non-LWOP alternative sentence for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. State v. Shaffer, 2011-1756, p. 3–4 (La. 11/23/11); 77 So. 3d 939, 942 (per curiam); 
see also State v. Mason, 2011-1190, p. 4–5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/12); 89 So. 3d 405, 408–09.  
 76. Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2010). Following Bonilla, Iowa 
enacted legislation providing that juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide class A 
felonies shall be eligible for parole only after serving twenty-five years. IOWA CODE § 902.1 
(West Supp. 2013). 
 77. Bonilla, 791 N.W.2d at 702 n.3. 
 78. Courts are split on whether Miller applies retroactively to invalidate LWOP 
sentences where inmates had already exhausted direct appeals prior to the Miller decision. 
Compare State v. Tate, 2012-2763 (La. 11/5/13) (Miller not retroactive), People v. Carp, 
828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (same), Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 
(Minn. 2013) (same), and Commonwealth v. Cunningham, No. 38 EAP 2012, 2013 WL 
5814388 (Pa. Oct. 30, 2013) (same), with State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (Miller 
retroactive), People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (same), and 
Jones v. State, 2009-CT-02033-SCT (Miss. 2013); 2013 WL 3756564 (en banc) (same). In 
cases before the Second and Eighth Circuits, the federal government conceded that Miller is 
retroactive. See Wang v. United States, No. 13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) (order granting 
successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(per curiam). 
 79. People v. Banks, No. 08CA0105, 2012 WL 4459101, at *20–21 (Colo. App. Sept. 
27, 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL 3168752 (Colo. June 24, 2013) (No. 12SC1022) 
(en banc). 
 80. Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 09-00963 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012) 
(memorandum of decision and order on the commonwealth’s motion to report questions); 
Commonwealth v. Peirce, No. MICR2010-01188 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012) 
(memorandum of decision and order on defendant’s motion to report questions). The cases 
are now pending before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
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sentencing court to consider,81 whereas other courts have specified the acceptable 
alternatives to LWOP. For example, the Alabama, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and 
Wyoming supreme courts held their mandatory LWOP statutes unconstitutional as 
applied to juvenile offenders and concluded that sentencing courts may impose 
either LWOP or life with a parole eligibility date to be determined by the 
sentencing court.82 The Arkansas and Missouri supreme courts have given 
sentencing courts broader discretion to impose term-of-years sentences. In 
Arkansas, the state supreme court remanded a mandatory LWOP case for 
resentencing and directed the sentencing judge to impose a term of years between 
ten and forty years, or life.83 The Missouri Supreme Court held that if the state 
failed to persuade the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that LWOP was 
appropriate, then the trial court should vacate the defendant’s first-degree murder 
conviction and impose a sentence for second-degree murder, which is punishable 
by a term of years between ten and thirty years, or life.84 
Timing issues have also arisen in cases involving prisoners who are not 
technically serving LWOP sentences but are instead serving lengthy term-of-years 
sentences or life sentences that permit parole only after a very long period of time. 
Some courts have held that only sentences that are actually LWOP sentences entitle 
prisoners to relief under the Eighth Amendment—regardless of the length of the 
sentence.85 Appellate courts are split on this issue in Florida, with several decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. 14-09-01040-CR, 2012 WL 6484718 (Tex. App. Dec. 
13, 2012); Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Daugherty v. 
State, 96 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Simmons, 2011-1810 
(La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28; cf. Rocker v. State, No. 2D10-5060, 2012 WL 5499975 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012) (remanding for resentencing and noting that LWOP would not 
be appropriate absent evidence that the juvenile shot the victim or intended that the victim be 
killed). 
 82. See Ex Parte Henderson, Nos. 1120140 & 1120202 2013 WL 4873077 (Ala. Sept. 
13, 2013) (refusing to dismiss capital felony charges requiring LWOP for juvenile 
defendants and holding that the sentencing court may impose LWOP or life with parole); 
Parker v. State, 2011-KA-01158-SCT (Miss. 2013), 119 So. 3d 987 (en banc) (remanding for 
resentencing to LWOP or life with parole); Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) 
(same); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (same). Intermediate 
appellate courts in some states have adopted the same approach. See People v. Eliason, 833 
N.W.2d 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (remanding case for resentencing to LWOP or life with 
parole). 
 83. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175. This ruling followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
remand of the case in the Miller/Jackson opinion. The Court rejected the state’s argument 
that the LWOP sentence should be converted to a sentence of life with the possibility of 
parole. 
 84. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 85. See, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (no relief on eighty-nine-
year sentence); Goins v. Smith, No. 4:09-CV-1551, 2012 WL 3023306, at *6 (N.D. Ohio 
July 24, 2012) (no relief on eighty-four-year sentence because “long, even life-long 
sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders do not run afoul of Graham’s holding unless 
the sentence is technically a life sentence without the possibility of parole”); State v. Brown, 
2012-KP-0872 (La. 5/7/13); 2013 WL 1878911, at *15 (“In our view, Graham does not 
prohibit consecutive term of year sentences for multiple offenses committed while a 
defendant was under the age of 18, even if they might exceed a defendant’s lifetime . . . .”). 
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finding lengthy term-of-years sentences unconstitutional under Graham86 and other 
decisions denying relief even where the sentence plainly means the prisoner will 
die in prison.87 The Florida Supreme Court is currently considering the issue. 
The California Supreme Court concluded that a sentence of 110 years to life for 
a nonhomicide crime committed by a juvenile offender violated Graham.88 The 
court instructed the sentencing court on remand to  
consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile’s crime 
and life, including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the 
time of the crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator 
or an aider and abettor, and his or her physical and mental 
development, so that it can impose a time when the juvenile offender 
will be able to seek parole from the parole board.89 
The court noted that the “Board of Parole Hearings will then determine whether the 
juvenile offender must be released from prison ‘based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.’”90 Following this decision, lower appellate courts in California 
have considered a number of cases where prisoners assert that their lengthy 
                                                                                                                 
The Virginia Supreme Court held that a life sentence provided a meaningful opportunity for 
release under Graham because release was possible under the state’s conditional release 
statute—which allows someone to petition for release and be subject to the ordinary parole-
consideration process after reaching the age of sixty and serving ten years in prison. Angel v. 
Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386 (Va. 2011). 
 86. Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 
8, 2012) (reversing sentence of sixty years with mandatory term of fifty years); Floyd v. 
State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing eighty-year sentence). These 
Florida cases granting relief have remanded for resentencing without giving any direction to 
the sentencing courts about how to comply with Graham on resentencing. Parole was 
abolished in Florida in 1994, and Florida courts have urged the legislature to create a 
mechanism to comply with the Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 78 So. 
3d 644, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). The parole board continues to hear cases 
where the conviction occurred prior to 1994. 
 87. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 374–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming eighty-
year sentence); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming ninety-
year sentence); Thomas, 78 So. 3d at 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming fifty-year 
sentence); Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming seventy-year 
sentence), review granted, 103 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2012) (No. SC12-1223). 
 88. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); see also People v. J.I.A., 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing sentence requiring minimum confinement 
of 56.5 years), cause transferred 287 P.3d 70 (Cal. 2012) (No. S194841); People v. De Jesús 
Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing sentence that precluded parole 
for 175 years); People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing 
sentence precluding parole for eighty-four years). 
 89. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295. The court noted that other prisoners could file habeas 
petitions to allow the sentencing court “to weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the 
extent of incarceration required before parole hearings,” and “[b]ecause every case will be 
different, we will not provide trial courts with a precise time frame for setting these future 
parole hearings in a nonhomicide case.” Id. at 295–96. A concurring justice argued that the 
court should have ordered a full resentencing. Id. at 298–99 (Werdegar, J., concurring).  
 90. Id. at 295 (majority opinion) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
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sentences are effectively LWOP. Relief has been granted in some of these cases 
and denied in others.91 
The Iowa Supreme Court held that that a juvenile offender serving a seventy-
five-year sentence for second-degree murder and first-degree robbery, who would 
not be eligible for parole for 52.5 years, was entitled to resentencing under Miller.92 
The court also remanded for resentencing in a case of a juvenile offender serving a 
fifty-year sentence for robbery and burglary. The court concluded that this 
sentence, which did not permit parole consideration for thirty-five years, did not 
provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” under Graham.93 
In sum, post-Graham/Miller litigation has focused on when prisoners will 
become eligible for relief, and little attention has been paid to the standards and 
procedures that should be used when entities consider whether to grant release. One 
exception has emerged in Michigan, where a federal district court held that 
Michigan’s statute prohibiting parole in first-degree murder cases is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied to juvenile offenders.94 In 
November 2013, the court ordered the state to create “an administrative structure” 
for the purpose of processing and determining the appropriateness of parole for 
juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.95 The court directed the state to give 
“notice to all such persons who have completed 10 years of imprisonment that their 
eligibility for parole will be considered in a meaningful and realistic manner.” In 
addition, the state must schedule public hearing for “each of the eligible prisoners 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, No. A134783, 2013 WL 2432510 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 4, 2013) (sentence of thirty-five years to life affirmed for felony murder);  People v. 
DeLeon, B226617, 2013 WL 785622 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2013) (“Eighth Amendment 
does not categorically bar imposition of a sentence of 40 years to life for a homicide 
committed by a juvenile who did not kill or intend to kill.”); People v. Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding for resentencing for juvenile sentenced to a 
minimum aggregate of 100 years for aiding and abetting a murder despite the fact that 
sentence on each charge separately was not life-equivalent). Currently pending before the 
California Supreme Court is the question of whether an LWOP sentence imposed on a 
juvenile for murder with special circumstances under section 190.5(b) of the Penal Code 
violates the Eighth Amendment after Miller. People v. Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013). Although section 190.5(b) 
gives discretion for judges to impose a sentence of either LWOP or twenty-five years to life, 
some appellate courts have interpreted the statute as establishing a presumption that LWOP 
is the appropriate sentence. See People v. Moffett, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012) (citing cases and remanding for resentencing, stating that “[a] presumption in favor of 
LWOP, such as that applied in this case, is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Miller, 
which cautions that LWOP sentences should be ‘uncommon’”), review granted, 290 P.3d 
1171 (Cal. 2013). The court in Moffett remanded for the sentencing court to determine 
whether to impose LWOP or life with parole after twenty-five years. 
 92. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013). 
 93. State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013). 
 94. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (opinion 
and order granting in part and denying part plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 
denying defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment). 
 95. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013) (order requiring 
immediate compliance with Miller).  
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making application for consideration” and “[p]ut in place a process for preliminary 
determination of appropriateness of submission of each eligible prisoner’s 
application for parole to the entire Parole Board.” The Parole Board must explain 
its decisions regarding whether to grant release and may not issue a “no interest” 
order or anything “materially like” a “no interest” order. Vetoes by the sentencing 
judge shall not be permitted and the proceedings “from an initial determination of 
eligibility will be fair, meaningful, and realistic.” Finally, the court stated that “no 
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a crime committed as a 
juvenile will be deprived of any educational or training program which is otherwise 
available to the general prison population.” The court gave the state until the end of 
the year to comply with the order, or a special master may be appointed to oversee 
compliance. 
B. Legislative Approaches 
In the wake of Graham and Miller, a number of states are considering 
legislation to respond to the decisions, and some states have already enacted 
legislation. With a few exceptions, the newly enacted statutes focus on the timing 
of parole eligibility for juveniles and do not provide special criteria or procedures 
for parole boards to consider in determining the suitability of these individuals for 
release. 
The new statutes can be divided into two categories. First, following Miller, 
some states with mandatory LWOP schemes enacted new statutes that retain the 
possibility of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders in at least some 
homicide cases but give judges discretion in these cases to impose sentences 
allowing the possibility of parole after a set period of time. Second, several states 
either eliminated LWOP sentences for juveniles entirely or provided opportunities 
for individuals serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juveniles to 
petition the court for sentence modification after a period of time. 
Seven states fall within the first category and enacted statutes that retain LWOP 
for juveniles but give judges greater discretion. Five of these states—North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Arkansas—provide no special 
criteria or procedures for parole boards to follow in assessing those inmates who 
receive parole-eligible sentences.96 In contrast, the Nebraska and Louisiana statutes 
provide some special rules for parole boards to follow in juvenile cases.97 
North Carolina was the first state to respond to Miller. The state’s new statute 
gives discretion to judges in first-degree murder cases to impose either LWOP or 
life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. North Carolina’s 
legislation eliminated LWOP as an option if the person is convicted under the 
felony murder doctrine. In those circumstances, the sentence must be life with the 
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.98 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 97. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text. 
 98. S.B. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012). 
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Pennsylvania also passed legislation retaining life-without-parole sentences for 
first-degree murder.99 However, as an alternative sentence for first-degree murder, 
the judge may now impose a sentence with a minimum of thirty-five years to life 
for youth ages fifteen to seventeen, and a minimum of twenty-five years to life for 
youth under the age of fifteen.100 In second-degree murder cases, where LWOP 
used to be mandatory, LWOP is no longer an option. Instead, youth ages fifteen to 
seventeen must receive a minimum thirty-years-to-life sentence, and youth under 
the age of fifteen must receive a minimum twenty-years-to-life sentence.101 
Under Utah’s new statute, judges in aggravated first-degree murder cases may 
impose LWOP or sentences that allow parole after at least twenty-five years.102 
Arkansas also retained LWOP as an option for juveniles in some homicide cases 
but now permits judges to impose sentences in those cases providing parole 
eligibility after twenty-eight years.103 New legislation in South Dakota retains life 
without parole as a sentencing option for judges in first- or second-degree murder 
cases.104 However, judges in these cases now also have the option of imposing any 
term-of-years sentence.105 
Unlike the statutes described above, new statutes in Nebraska and Louisiana 
address parole board hearing procedures for juveniles. Nebraska’s new legislation 
retains life-without-parole sentences for juveniles but makes such sentences 
discretionary.106 In class IA felony cases, judges may now impose a minimum 
sentence of forty years,107 which allows parole eligibility after twenty years.108 The 
Nebraska statute provides special criteria for the parole board to consider in 
juvenile cases.109 Significantly, after an initial denial decision, the board must 
consider the inmate for release every year after the denial.110 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. S.B. 850, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. S.B. 228, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013). 
 103. H.B. 1993, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
 104. S.B. 39, 2013 Leg. Assemb., 88th Sess. (S.D. 2013). 
 105. See id. 
 106. Legis. B. 44, 103 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013). 
 107. Id.  
 108. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-1,110 (West, WestlawNext through end of 2013 reg. sess.). 
 109. These factors are the following: 
(a) The offender’s educational and court documents; 
(b) The offender’s participation in available rehabilitative and educational 
programs while incarcerated; 
(c) The offender’s age at the time of the offense; 
(d) The offender’s level of maturity; 
(e) The offender’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of his or her 
conduct; 
(f) The offender’s intellectual capacity; 
(g) The offender’s level of participation in the offense; 
(h) The offender’s efforts toward rehabilitation; and 
(i) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance submitted by the offender. 
Neb. Legis. B. 44. 
 110. Id. 
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New statutes enacted in Louisiana also address parole hearing procedures. The 
first Louisiana statute, passed after Graham but before Miller, applies retroactively 
to anyone serving an LWOP sentence for a crime committed under the age of 
eighteen, except those convicted of first- and second-degree murder.111 Under the 
statute, these inmates are eligible for parole after serving thirty years if various 
criteria relating to rehabilitation have been met.112 The statute requires the parole 
board to meet in a three-member panel when considering an eligible juvenile 
offender for release, and, in determining if release is appropriate in these cases, the 
parole board shall consider an “evaluation of the offender by a person who has 
expertise in adolescent brain development and behavior and any other relevant 
evidence pertaining to the offender.”113 The panel must also “render specific 
findings of fact in support of its decision.”114 The second Louisiana statute, enacted 
after Miller, allows parole eligibility for juvenile offenders after thirty-five years in 
first- and second-degree murder cases—if the sentencing court determines that the 
person is entitled to parole eligibility.115 Before imposing a life-without-parole 
sentence, the court must hold a hearing and consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. LWOP sentences “should normally be reserved for the worst 
offenders and the worst cases.”116 The statute adopts the same procedures and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 112. Id. The criteria for parole eligibility are the following: 
(a) The offender has served thirty years of the sentence imposed. 
(b) The offender has not committed any disciplinary offenses in the twelve 
consecutive months prior to the parole eligibility date. 
(c) The offender has completed the mandatory minimum of one hundred hours 
of prerelease programming in accordance with R.S. 15:827.1. 
(d) The offender has completed substance abuse treatment as applicable. 
(e) The offender has obtained a GED certification, unless the offender has 
previously obtained a high school diploma or is deemed by a certified educator 
as being incapable of obtaining a GED certification due to a learning disability. 
If the offender is deemed incapable of obtaining a GED certification, the 
offender shall complete at least one of the following: 
(i) A literacy program. 
(ii) An adult basic education program. 
(iii) A job skills training program. 
(f) The offender has obtained a low-risk level designation determined by a 
validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of the 
Department of Public Safety and Corrections. 
(g) The offender has completed a reentry program to be determined by the 
Department of Public Safety and Corrections. 
(h) If the offender was convicted of aggravated rape, he shall be designated a 
sex offender and upon release shall comply with all sex offender registration 
and notification provisions as required by law. 
Id.  
 113. Id. § 15.574.4(d)(2). 
 114. Id. § 15.574.4(d)(3). 
 115. H.B. 152, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). 
 116. Id. 
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criteria for parole-release decisions as those applicable in the nonhomicide cases 
addressed by the first legislation in Louisiana.117 
The second category of statutes eliminates LWOP entirely for juvenile offenders 
or provides the opportunity for individuals serving LWOP sentences for crimes 
committed as juveniles to petition the court for sentence modification after a period 
of time. Prior to Graham and Miller, Colorado enacted legislation prospectively 
eliminating LWOP for individuals under the age of eighteen and providing that 
those convicted of a class 1 felony must be sentenced to life with the chance of 
parole after forty years.118 Texas also acted prior to Graham and Miller and passed 
a statute providing that individuals under the age of seventeen convicted of capital 
felony are subject to life sentences with the possibility of parole after forty years 
rather than LWOP.119 Following Miller, Texas expanded this reform to reach 
seventeen-year-olds as well.120 In addition, after Miller, Wyoming eliminated life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles.121 Under the law, individuals convicted of 
first-degree murder committed under the age of eighteen are subject to life 
sentences with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.122 The Colorado, 
Texas, and Wyoming legislation provide no special procedures or criteria for the 
parole board in these juvenile cases. 
 New legislation in Delaware also eliminated sentences of life without the 
possibility of release for juveniles. Under the legislation, individuals serving 
mandatory sentences of natural life without the possibility of release for crimes 
committed as juveniles will now be resentenced and subject to a sentencing range 
of twenty-five years to life.123 In addition, the law allows juveniles sentenced to 
more than twenty years to petition for sentence modification. Modification requests 
may be filed after thirty years for first-degree murder convictions and after twenty 
years for all other cases.124 Inmates may receive subsequent reviews after five-year 
intervals, with discretion for the court to lengthen the time between petitions.125 
The statute does not provide criteria for the court to consider in determining 
whether to grant a resentencing request. In contrast to all of the states described 
above, Delaware’s statute does not rely on a parole board to assess a juvenile 
offender’s suitability for release. 
The California legislature has enacted two relevant statutes since Miller. First, in 
September 2012, the governor signed Senate Bill 9, which allows individuals 
sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed under the age of eighteen to petition the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I) (West 2013). The governor has 
discretion to grant parole earlier if extraordinary mitigating circumstances exist. Id. 
§ 17-22.5-403.7(2). 
 119. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(b) (West 2013). 
 120. S.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
 121. H.B. 23, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
 122. Id. The Act also allows for parole if the juvenile’s sentence is commuted to a term of 
years. It further provides that juvenile offenders will not be eligible for parole if they commit 
specified acts after the age of eighteen. Id. 
 123. S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., sec. 6 (Del. 2013). 
 124. Id. sec. 4(d)(1)–(2), § 4202A. 
 125. Id. sec. 4(d)(3), § 4202A. 
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court for resentencing after fifteen years if certain criteria are met.126 In cases where 
the prisoner is serving LWOP as a result of conviction for first-degree murder with 
special circumstances, the court may resentence the individual to life with the 
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.127 This statute contained no provisions 
addressing the nature of the future parole hearing.128 
A year later, in September 2013, the governor signed a second bill, 
Senate Bill 260, which creates special parole hearing procedures and criteria for 
eligible juveniles.129 In particular, the statute requires the parole board to conduct 
“youthful offender parole hearings” for eligible prisoners that “provide for a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2013). The bill that was enacted 
was S.B. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). The statute applies retroactively to prisoners 
currently serving LWOP sentences. 
 127. In California, youth ages sixteen and seventeen convicted of murder in the first 
degree with special circumstances may be sentenced to LWOP or life with the chance of 
parole after twenty-five years, in the discretion of the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) 
(West 2008). Under the new legislation, the court can order a resentencing and convert the 
LWOP sentence to life with the chance of parole after twenty-five years. See id. 
§ 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2013). If the court denies the first request for resentencing, 
the inmate has two more opportunities to seek resentencing. Id. § 1170(2)(H). 
 128. The California legislation does contain criteria for the court to consider in 
determining whether to grant the resentencing request. In particular, the court must consider 
certain factors: 
(i) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and 
abetting murder provisions of law. 
(ii) The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or 
other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims 
prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall. 
(iii) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant. 
(iv) Prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall, 
the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered 
from psychological or physical trauma, or significant stress. 
(v) The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness, 
developmental disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense, but 
influenced the defendant’s involvement in the offense. 
(vi) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the 
potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing himself or 
herself of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs 
have been available at his or her classification level and facility, using self-
study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse. 
(vii) The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others 
through letter writing, calls, or visits, or has eliminated contact with individuals 
outside of prison who are currently involved with crime. 
(viii) The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the 
last five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor.  
Id. § 1170(d)(2)(F). 
 129. S.B. 260, 2013 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
2014] REVIEW FOR RELEASE 393 
 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”130 In reviewing the prisoner’s suitability 
for parole, the board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of 
juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent 
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case 
law.”131 The statute permits statements to be submitted to the board from “[f]amily 
members, friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from 
community-based organizations with knowledge about the individual before the 
crime or his or her growth and maturity.”132 In addition, subject to several 
exceptions,133 Senate Bill 260 provides that juvenile offenders will be eligible for 
parole at a youthful offender parole hearing as follows: (1) those sentenced to 
determinate sentences will be eligible after fifteen years, (2) those sentenced to less 
than twenty-five years to life will be eligible after twenty years, and (3) those 
sentenced to twenty-five years to life will be eligible after twenty-five years.134 
Thus, in California, juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP can now petition the 
court for resentencing pursuant to the provisions created by Senate Bill 9. If the 
court grants resentencing and imposes a sentence of twenty-five years to life, the 
prisoner will be considered for parole pursuant to the “youth offender parole 
hearing” provisions of Senate Bill 260. 
 Several states are considering legislation that provides special criteria and 
procedures for parole boards to use in juvenile cases. For example, legislation 
considered last session by the Connecticut legislature would have eliminated 
LWOP for juvenile offenders and created special parole eligibility rules for 
juveniles serving lengthy sentences.135 Significantly, the bill provides for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Id. § 4(e). The statute requires the board to “review and, as necessary, revise existing 
regulations and adopt new regulations” to ensure a meaningful opportunity to obtain release for 
eligible juvenile offenders. Id. 
 131. Id. § 5(c). In addition, the statute provides that  
[i]n assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment 
instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by licensed psychologists 
employed by the board and shall take into consideration the diminished culpability 
of juveniles as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any 
subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual. 
 Id. § 4(f)(1). 
 132. Id. § 4(f)(2). 
 133. The statute does not apply to juveniles sentenced under the three strikes law or 
“Jessica’s law,” or sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. § 4(h). The bill 
also excludes individuals convicted of some crimes committed after turning eighteen. Id. 
 134. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 135. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013). H.B. 6581 passed the House 
of Representatives by a vote of 137–4, but was not called for a vote in the state Senate before the 
end of the legislative session. See Bill Status for Substitute for Raised H.B. No. 6581, CT.GOV, 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num
=6581&which_year=2013&SUBMIT1.x=0&SUBMIT1.y=0. Currently in Connecticut, 
individuals convicted of murder, felony murder, and several other serious offenses are not 
eligible for parole, and prisoners convicted of other violent felonies are eligible only after serving 
85% of the sentence. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(b)–(c) (West Supp. 2013). The bill, as 
amended by the House, provides parole eligibility for juvenile offenders after twelve years, or 
60% of the sentence, whichever is longer. Under the bill, those serving more than fifty years 
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appointment of counsel for indigent inmates twelve months prior to the parole 
hearing.136 Regarding parole hearing procedures, the bill allows counsel for the 
inmate and the prosecutor to provide written submissions, allows the board to hear 
testimony of experts or other witnesses at the board’s request, and allows the 
inmate and victim to make a statement at the hearing.137 The bill also provides 
specific criteria for the board to consider in assessing release.138 
                                                                                                                 
(including life without parole) are eligible for parole after serving thirty years. The bill also 
makes juveniles ineligible for murder with special circumstances, which carries a mandatory 
life-without-parole sentence. The Connecticut Sentencing Commission recommended the 
original legislative proposal, which provided parole eligibility after ten years or 50% of the 
sentence served, whichever was longer, for those sentenced to less than sixty years and provided 
for parole eligibility after thirty years for those sentenced to sixty years or more. Conn. 
Sentencing Comm’n, Juvenile Sentence Reconsideration Proposal, CT.GOV, 
http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjabout/sentencingcommission/20121129_juvenile
_sentence_reconsideration_proposal_r.pdf; Conn. Sentencing Comm’n, Miller v. Alabama 
Proposal, CT.GOV, http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjabout/sentencingcommission
/20121129_miller_v_alabama_proposal_r.pdf .  
 136. Conn. H.B. 6581. The Connecticut proposal is the only state proposal thus far to include 
a provision for appointment of counsel in the parole process. Note, however, that California and 
Massachusetts provide counsel at all “lifer” parole hearings—i.e., those hearings for inmates 
serving life sentences who are eligible for parole. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation, Life 
Parole Process, CA.GOV, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/life_parole_process/index.html; Second 
Degree Lifer Parole Hearing Process, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and
-cj/parole/trans-svcs-unit/second-degree-lifer-parole-hearing-process.html. 
 137. Conn. H.B. 6581. 
 138. The bill provides: 
After such hearing, the board may allow such person to go at large on parole with 
respect to any portion of a sentence that was based on a crime or crimes committed 
while such person was under eighteen years of age if the board finds that such 
parole release would be consistent with the factors set forth in subdivisions (1) to 
(4), inclusive, of subsection (c) of section 54-300 and if it appears, from all 
available information, including, but not limited to, any reports from the 
Commissioner of Correction, that (A) there is a reasonable probability that such 
person will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; (B) the benefits to 
such person and society that would result from such person’s release to community 
supervision substantially outweigh the benefits to such person and society that 
would result from such person’s continued incarceration; and (C) such person has 
demonstrated substantial rehabilitation since the date such crime or crimes were 
committed considering such person’s character, background and history, as 
demonstrated by factors including, but not limited to, such person’s correctional 
record, the age and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission 
of the crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse and 
increased maturity since the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, such 
person’s contributions to the welfare of other persons through service, such 
person’s efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education 
or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the adult 
correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional 
system and the overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the nature 
and circumstances of the crime or crimes. 
Id. 
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C. Clemency 
Some states have responded to Graham and Miller by modifying sentences 
through clemency grants.139 Following Miller, in Iowa, the governor commuted the 
LWOP sentences being served by thirty-eight juvenile offenders to life sentences 
with parole eligibility after sixty years.140 The Iowa Supreme Court later found that 
this action did not render the sentences constitutional.141 In Nebraska, the Pardons 
Board announced in November 2012 plans to conduct hearings for juvenile 
offenders serving LWOP sentences.142 The Board, which is comprised of the 
governor, state attorney general, and secretary of state, has the power to commute 
sentences. Under the Board’s plan, the new minimum sentence for prisoners would 
be fifty years.143 The Board notified inmates and victims shortly before the planned 
hearings, and many objected to the plan, including defense lawyers and victims’ 
families.144 The hearings were canceled after a Nebraska judge enjoined the Board 
from acting.145 
Prior to Graham and Miller, in 2007, Colorado’s governor created a juvenile 
clemency board with authority to review clemency requests by juvenile offenders 
serving adult sentences.146 Juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences—who were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Before Miller, Anthony Thompson argued that clemency should be granted on a 
systematic basis to juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences for homicide offenses. Anthony 
C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2641 (2011). Professor 
Thompson asserted that clemency was justified in light of the Court’s “inherently illogical” 
conclusion in Graham that juvenile homicide offenders could continue to be subject to LWOP. 
Id. at 2642. 
 140. See James Q. Lynch, Trish Mehaffey & Mike Wiser, Branstad Commutes Life 
Sentences for 38 Iowa Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa) (July 7, 2012, 10:05 
PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commutes-life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile
-murderers/. 
 141. Following the commutation, an Iowa trial court concluded that the clemency grant 
failed to comply with Miller and held that one of these individuals, who had served twenty-five 
years, should be immediately eligible for parole. See Chad Nation, Jeffrey Ragland, Sentenced 
to Life at 17, May Soon be a Free Man, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:47 AM), 
http://www.omaha.com/article/20120829/NEWS/708299918/1694. The Iowa Supreme Court 
affirmed. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013). 
 142. Todd Cooper, Pardon Board’s Plan to Resentence 27 Inmates Draws Chorus of 
Objections, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 28, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www.omaha.com
/article/20121128/NEWS/121129631/1690#pardon-board-s-plan-to-resentence-27-inmates
-draws-chorus-of-objections. The Board announced that it would hear only five minutes of 
testimony in the juvenile cases from the Attorney General’s Office, the prosecutor involved in 
the case, one victim representative, and one inmate representative. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Todd Cooper & Martha Stoddard, Judge Grants Injunction to Stop Hearings for 
Juvenile Lifers, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 30, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://
www.omaha.com/article/20121130/NEWS/711299887/1694#judge-grants-injunction-to
-stop-hearings-for-juvenile-lifers. 
 146. See Colo. Exec. Order No. B 009 07 (2007); Thompson, supra note 139, at 2701–05 
(discussing the creation of Colorado’s juvenile clemency board). 
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unaffected by Colorado’s prospective elimination of LWOP for juveniles—are 
eligible to apply for clemency after serving at least ten years in prison.147 
III. EXISTING PAROLE BOARD STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 
As discussed above, state courts, legislatures, and governors have started to 
respond to Graham and Miller. For the most part, states have simply made juvenile 
offenders eligible for parole under existing parole board systems. States have been 
focused primarily on the timing of eligibility for release, and most appear to assume 
that existing state parole practices will provide the meaningful opportunity for release 
required by the Eighth Amendment.  
Historically, state parole boards have been able to make release decisions with 
little oversight from the courts regarding the criteria and procedures used for these 
decisions. In ordinary adult cases, there is no constitutional requirement that states 
provide a parole release mechanism at all—determinate sentencing is entirely 
lawful.148 Moreover, even when a state provides a parole release process, courts have 
imposed few constraints.149 Graham promises to change the interaction among courts 
and parole boards because the decision mandates a release mechanism that complies 
with constitutional standards. Simply making a juvenile offender eligible for parole 
under an existing parole system may not guarantee compliance with Graham’s 
mandate.150 
Before assessing whether existing state parole practices comply with Graham’s 
meaningful opportunity requirement, one needs to have an understanding of the 
systems actually in place. Below, I consider existing parole standards and procedures. 
A. Standards for Assessing Parole Release Suitability 
State parole boards have traditionally had great flexibility in terms of the criteria 
that they use in making release decisions, and they have not been required to provide 
a realistic opportunity for release to prisoners.151  
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the discretionary nature of parole 
decision making, observing that the parole release decision “depends on an amalgam 
of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective 
appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and 
sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.”152 In considering the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. Thompson, supra note 139, at 2704. 
 148. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) (“There is no right 
under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 
sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 149. See infra notes 151–70 and accompanying text.  
 150. See infra note 345 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the benefits of 
appellate review of parole board decisions to ensure a meaningful opportunity for release.  
 151. See W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate 
Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 944 (2009) (“[A] parole 
board is free to deny parole for whatever reason, on whatever facts, for however long.”). 
 152. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). The 
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suitability of a prisoner for release, parole boards have typically considered factors 
including the prisoner’s background; the seriousness of the original offense; the 
prisoner’s level of remorse; the degree of the prisoner’s rehabilitation; the views of 
the victim, prosecutor, and community members; the potential danger to the 
community if the prisoner is released; and whether a release plan is in place that will 
provide the supportive services necessary for successful integration into the 
community.153 More recently, parole boards have focused increasingly on the degree 
of danger presented by the inmate.154 
In many states, the chance of obtaining parole is slim, particularly if the 
underlying offense was violent. Sharon Dolovich observes that “[w]hat in the middle 
decades of the 20th century was a meaningful process in which parole boards 
seriously considered individual claims of rehabilitation has become in most cases a 
meaningless ritual in which the form is preserved but parole is rarely granted.”155 In 
some states, parole boards release only a small percent of individuals eligible for 
release. For example, in 2011 in Ohio, 6.9% of prisoners were granted release after 
release consideration hearings.156 In Florida, 3.5% of parole release decisions resulted 
in a grant of parole in fiscal year 2011–2012.157 
Board members have few incentives to release individuals convicted of violent 
crimes, and plenty of disincentives. When a parolee commits a violent crime after 
release—which will inevitably happen in at least a small percentage of cases—parole 
boards face major public criticism.158 Such events may cause parole release rates 
within a state to shift over time.159 The nature of the crime of conviction is often the 
driving force in parole decisions.160 
                                                                                                                 
Court noted that the parole release decision “turns on a ‘discretionary assessment of a 
multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become 
rather than simply what he has done.’” Id. (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the 
Expert—Counsel in the Penal Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)).  
 153. Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1750–51. 
 154. Id. at 1751. 
 155. Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: 
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 110–11 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 
2012). 
 156. OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTH., PAROLE BOARD REPORT 1 (2012), available at http://
www.drc.ohio.gov/web/Reports/ParoleBoard/Calendar%20Year%202011%20Report.pdf. 
 157. See FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2011–12, at 18–19, available at https://
fpc.state.fl.us/PDFs/FPCannualreport201112.pdf. In both Ohio and Florida, parole was 
eliminated in the mid-1990s, but it remains available for inmates sentenced under the old 
regimes. In contrast, in Texas the overall parole approval rate for fiscal year 2011 was 31%. 
TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FY 2011, at 4, available at 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/BPP%20StatisticalReport_08-08-2012.pdf. 
 158. See, e.g., Maria Cramer & Jonathan Saltzman, ’09 Parole of Officer’s Killer Gets 
Hard Look, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2010, at B1.  
 159. Ishan Taylor, Halting Parole Spurs Concerns of Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, 
at O6 (discussing impact of triple homicide by parolees on parole release rates in 
Connecticut); After Board Shakeup, Parole Rates Down in 2011, WBUR (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.wbur.org/2011/08/09/massachusett-parole-rates (noting that parole release rates 
were down in Massachusetts after governor changed composition of board in wake of 
murder of police officer by parolee).  
 160. Ball, supra note 151, at 900–01. 
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Recent litigation in California has challenged exclusive reliance on the offense 
in denying parole. In California, parole decisions must be based on certain statutory 
factors, and courts have found that due process requires that board decisions 
considering these factors be supported by “some evidence.”161 In 2008, the 
California Supreme Court held that the “some evidence” standard was not satisfied 
where the governor reversed the parole board’s recommendation for parole release 
based solely on the nature of the inmate’s offense.162 The decision may have had 
some impact on release rates. A 2011 study of the California parole system found 
that “an inmate’s chance of being granted parole has increased in the last two 
years.” However, the study also concluded that “the length of time he or she must 
wait for a subsequent hearing when denied parole has also increased.”163 Overall, 
the chance of an inmate serving a life sentence being granted parole by the board 
and not having the decision reversed by the governor was approximately 6% in 
2010.164 
Despite the California example, court oversight of substantive parole decisions 
is rare. For example, the Second Circuit recently rejected a challenge to New 
York’s parole release process, holding that the state’s alleged unofficial policy to 
deny parole to all violent felony offenders was not unconstitutional.165 States have, 
for the most part, been free to set their own criteria for release and have had great 
discretion in determining how realistic to make the possibility of release for 
prisoners.166 Unless state statutes specifically provide a basis for court oversight, 
courts have been largely uninvolved in monitoring parole decisions. 
B. Existing Parole Board Procedures: A National Survey 
In addition to having discretion over the criteria used for release decisions, states 
have also had great leeway in the procedures used by their parole boards in 
considering release. Under the federal constitution, parole release procedures need 
not comply with even minimal due process standards. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,167 the Supreme Court held that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 546–48 (Cal. 2008). 
 162. Id. at 555. In California, the governor can reverse decisions of the parole board.  
 163. ROBERT WEISBERG, DEBBIE A. MUKAMAL & JORDAN D. SEGALL, STANFORD 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., LIFE IN LIMBO: AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR 
PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 4 
(2011), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/files/2011/09/SCJC_report
_Parole_Release_for_Lifers.pdf. 
 164. Id. There has been fluctuation in the rate of reversals of the board’s release decisions 
by the governor. As of April 2011, Governor Jerry Brown had overruled fewer than 20% of 
the parole dates approved by the board. In contrast, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
overruled 70% of decisions, and Governor Gray Davis reversed 98%. Bob Egelko, Life with 
Parole About a 20-year Term, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 2011, at C2. 
 165. Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). In New York, as of 
2009, the initial parole release rate was 8% for individuals serving life sentences for A-1 
violent felonies, with the subsequent parole release rate at 13%. Alan Rosenthal, Patricia 
Warth & Andy Correia, Parole Reform, ATTICUS, Winter 2011, at 27, 27. 
 166. See Ball, supra note 151, at 944. 
 167. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).  
2014] REVIEW FOR RELEASE 399 
 
mere existence of a parole release process does not create a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in parole release. The Court nevertheless found that 
because Nebraska’s parole statute created an expectation of release, minimal due 
process standards were required in that instance.168 However, following Greenholtz, 
states can avoid creating protected liberty interests by adopting statutes and 
regulations that make parole release discretionary. In other words, statutes 
providing that a parole board “may” (rather than “shall”) release a prisoner if 
various criteria are met do not create a liberty interest.169 Moreover, even if the 
language of a particular state statute creates a liberty interest in parole release, the 
due process protections that will attach are quite modest.170 
Thus, states have been able to adopt parole release procedures free from federal 
constitutional constraints. Graham raises the question of whether these existing 
procedures will provide meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders. To assess this 
question, one must understand the nature of the parole procedures actually in place. 
Yet there is little recent scholarship regarding parole release processes171 and no 
up-to-date information compiled regarding the procedures currently used by parole 
boards around the country.172 
To fill this void, this Article provides a comprehensive examination of parole 
release procedures nationwide. In June 2012, I sent a survey to the chairs of the 
parole releasing authorities in the forty-nine states where such authorities 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Id. at 12; see also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (Montana statute 
created a liberty interest in parole). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. 
Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), which rejected the view that a state regulation created a liberty 
interest for purposes of prison disciplinary proceedings, some scholars questioned whether 
Greenholtz remained good law. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 151, at 947. However, the Court’s 
more recent decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011) (per curiam), explicitly 
relies on Greenholtz. Id. at 862–63. 
 169. See, e.g., Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir. 1988) (no right to a 
hearing because no protected liberty interest in parole); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 
1217–18 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869–70 (10th Cir. 
1981). 
 170. In Greenholtz, the Court found that a formal evidentiary hearing was not required 
for every inmate and refused to require that every adverse parole decision include a 
statement of the evidence relied upon. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15.  
 171. Some articles about parole board decision making were published in the 1970s, 
when indeterminate sentencing came under scrutiny. See, e.g., Project, Parole Release 
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 814–17 (1975); Comment, 
The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 284–86 (1971). Although there are several 
examples of more recent scholarship, see, e.g., Ball, supra note 151; Dolovich, supra note 
155; Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole 
Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 567–69 (1994), parole has received relatively little academic 
attention.  
 172. It appears that the only attempt at collection of information about parole boards 
nationwide has come from the Association of Paroling Authorities International (APAI). 
APAI conducted a survey in 2007 that asked parole boards various questions about the 
procedures used in parole release decisions. See SUSAN C. KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, CTR. 
FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH & SOC. POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE APAI’S INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES (2008), available at http://www.apaintl.org/documents
/surveys/2008.pdf. APAI has not updated this survey. 
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operate.173 In all, forty-five states responded to the survey.174 Below, the results of 
the survey are reviewed.175 
1. Direct Interaction with Inmates 
One set of questions in the survey focused on the nature of the interaction 
between the decision makers on the parole board and the prisoner. Forty-three state 
boards conduct interviews or hearings with inmates, in at least some cases, as part 
of the parole release process. Two states (Alabama and North Carolina) report that 
interaction with the inmate is not part of the process in any case. Nine boards call 
these interactions with inmates “interviews,”176 thirty states categorize them as 
“hearings,”177 and four use both terms.178 Nine boards conduct these proceedings 
exclusively in person.179 Eight boards rely exclusively on videoconferencing or 
telephone.180 The remaining boards use some combination of in-person meetings, 
video conferencing, and telephone hearings.181 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. Releasing authorities have somewhat different names in different states. For 
simplicity, this Article refers to all state releasing authorities as “parole boards.” Maine does 
not have a parole release process. 
 174. Surveys were received from every state except for Arizona, Indiana, Mississippi, 
and Oklahoma. 
 175. The survey asked states the following question: “Do any special procedures or 
guidelines apply when the inmate being considered for parole release is serving a sentence 
based on an offense committed as a juvenile?” Follow-up with states that answered yes to 
this question revealed that some boards use special criteria relating to age at the time of the 
offense in assessing parole eligibility or suitability, but none of the boards use different 
procedures in considering these cases. Note that California, Louisiana, and Nebraska have 
since enacted statutes with special procedures governing parole in some cases involving 
juvenile offenders. See supra notes 106–17, 126–34 and accompanying text. 
 176. Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. 
 177. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. 
 178. Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Wyoming. 
 179. California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Texas, 
and Wyoming. Georgia reports that a parole staff member interviews an inmate in person as 
part of the “parole consideration process.” However, this will typically occur during the 
“initial prison diagnostic process.” 
 180. Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and 
South Carolina. 
 181. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 




Figure 1. Type of hearing or interview 
 
In some states, the individual or individuals speaking directly with the inmate in an 
interview or hearing is not the same person or group that makes the decision regarding 
release. The survey defined “releasing authority member” as an individual with the 
authority by law to make parole release decisions. Twenty-four boards use panels 
comprised exclusively of releasing authority members for interviews or hearings with 
inmates, and panels range in size from two to seven members.182 Four boards use 
individual members of releasing authorities to conduct interviews or hearings with 
inmates,183 and one state uses an individual member in some instances and a panel in 
other instances.184 Three boards conduct interviews using exclusively employees of the 
releasing authority who lack decision-making authority.185 Eleven boards use non-
decision makers to conduct at least some of the interviews or hearings.186 
In several states, a hearing occurs in front of the decision makers, but the inmate is 
not present.187 For example, in Florida, an inmate is interviewed by an employee of the 
releasing authority, and then the decision makers conduct a separate hearing that the 
prosecutor, victim, and others may attend. Alabama’s board has no direct interaction 
with the prisoner at all, but decision makers conduct a hearing with other participants. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 183. Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. 
 184. Kansas. 
 185. Florida, Georgia, and Virginia. 
 186. Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. 
 187. Florida and Alabama. 
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2. Role of Counsel for the Prisoner 
A second set of questions focused on the role of counsel for prisoners at parole 
release hearings. Thirty-nine boards report that input from an inmate’s attorney is 
considered by the board in the parole release decision, and six boards do not consider 
input from a prisoner’s attorney at all.188 Thirty-two boards allow attorneys the 
opportunity to make an in-person statement,189 with seven allowing attorney input only 
through some combination of written, telephone, or videotaped correspondence.190 
Fourteen boards do not permit an attorney to be present at all for the inmate’s interview 
or hearing,191 with one state allowing the attorney to be present only at some types of 
hearings.192 Florida and Alabama do not permit an inmate to appear at the hearing 
before the releasing authority members, but do permit an attorney to appear and speak 




Figure 2. Input from prisoner’s attorney 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. The six states that do not consider attorney input are Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Michigan, New Mexico, and Vermont. New Mexico noted that written information may be 
submitted but does not weigh in the decision. 
 189. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. In some states, this in-person input from the attorney is not permitted at the time 
of the inmate’s interview or hearing, but rather is allowed at a separate meeting.  
 190. Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, and 
Wisconsin. 
 191. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
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Thirty-five boards permit an attorney for the inmate to present a written report 
from a mental health professional who has evaluated the inmate,193 with twenty-
three of those boards also allowing the attorney to present oral testimony or a 
statement from the expert.194 Twenty boards allow attorneys to present the oral 
testimony or statements of other witnesses at some types of hearings.195 
Ten boards report that they can appoint an attorney to represent an indigent 
inmate in the parole release process in at least some cases at no cost to the 
inmate.196 New Jersey reports that it would appoint counsel only if the prisoner was 
“incompetent to understand the nature of the parole hearing.” Similarly, Tennessee 
states that appointment of counsel “would occur in situations where offender is 
mentally challenged or physically incapacitated.” In Ohio, public defenders 
represent inmates at all full board open hearings, which occur only after the board 
votes to recommend release and the prosecutor, victim, or court objects. In 
Massachusetts and California, individuals serving life sentences with the chance of 
parole have a right to appointed counsel. The remaining thirty-five states report that 
they do not appoint counsel in any parole release case. 
3. Role of the Prosecutor 
Forty-three boards reported that they consider input from the prosecutor’s office 
in making a parole release decision. Of these boards, thirty allow an in-person 
statement from the prosecutor at an interview, hearing, or in-person meeting.197 
Thirteen allow input only through written correspondence, telephone interview, or 
videotaped correspondence.198 Two states (New Mexico and Wyoming) do not 
consider input from prosecutors in making the release decision.199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 194. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. 
Massachusetts reported allowing attorneys to present oral testimony or a statement from a 
mental health expert at just some types of hearings. 
 195. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Massachusetts reported allowing attorneys to 
present oral testimony or statements of other witnesses at just some types of hearings. 
 196. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, 
Tennessee, and Washington.  
 197. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 198. Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 199. New Mexico noted that written information may be submitted but does not weigh in 
the decision. 





Figure 3. Input from prosecutor 
 
Sixteen boards allow the prosecutor to present testimony or statements from 
witnesses at the parole release hearing or interview.200 Of these boards, only one 
(New Hampshire) allows the inmate or his attorney to cross-examine the 
witnesses.201 New Hampshire also allows the prosecutor to cross-examine the 
inmate at the hearing and to cross-examine individuals who make statements on 
behalf of the inmate.202 
4. Victim Input 
All boards responding to the survey consider input from the victim or victim’s 
representative in the parole release decision.203 All boards except for one allow the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Tennessee. 
 201. Massachusetts responded “maybe” to this question, and South Dakota said “it had 
never come up” previously, but the board would allow it if it did. 
 202. Massachusetts responded “maybe” to this question. 
 203. Some states have statutory or constitutional requirements regarding victim 
participation in parole proceedings. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(9) (victim has 
right “[t]o be heard at any proceeding when any post-conviction release from confinement is 
being considered”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2)(c) (victim has right to be “[h]eard at all 
proceedings for the . . . release of a convicted person after trial”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 56.02 (a)(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing victims with the right to 
“participate in the parole process”); see also Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime 
Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 382–99 
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victim to make an in-person statement at an interview or hearing. Pennsylvania 
permits only written or videotaped correspondence. 
5. Other Input 
Forty-four boards report that written case history and summaries of the inmate’s 
background are compiled for consideration by the board in the parole release 
decision.204 In twelve states, an employee of the board compiles these 
summaries.205 In twenty-one states, an employee of the department of corrections 
compiles these summaries.206 Eleven states use a combination of department of 
corrections and board employees to compile summaries.207 
Forty-three boards consider input from others who know the inmate (such as 
family members, employers, relationship group members, teachers, or 
counselors).208 In twenty-nine states, input may be provided from at least some of 
these categories of individuals through an in-person statement at an interview, 
hearing, or other form of meeting.209 Thirteen states permit this form of input only 
by written, telephone, or videotaped correspondence.210 
6. Access to Information 
Twenty-eight boards prevent inmates from full access to information provided 
by the prosecutor’s office,211 and thirty-seven boards prevent inmates from full 
access to input provided by the victim or victim’s representative.212 When a mental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. In Oregon, summaries are compiled in only some types of cases. New Mexico 
reports that the board members consider the entire inmate’s file. 
 205. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington. 
 206. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
 207. Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia. 
 208. In Alaska, input from such individuals is not considered. New Mexico reports that 
input from such individuals may be submitted in writing, but will not weigh in the decision. 
 209. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Massachusetts 
reported that in-person input from these individuals is permitted only at some types of 
hearings. 
 210. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 211. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 212. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
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health professional employed by the parole board conducts an evaluation of an 
inmate for the board’s consideration, twelve states do not permit inmates to see the 
conclusions and recommendations of the professional.213 
IV. CONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF GRAHAM’S MANDATE TO THE STATES 
As discussed, states around the country have started to respond to Graham and 
Miller. A number of states have simply made juvenile offenders eligible for parole 
under existing state parole regimes, and other states are considering this approach. 
The survey results described above detail existing parole board procedures in states 
around the country. Next, I explore the scope of Graham’s meaningful opportunity 
requirement. Then, informed by the survey results, I consider whether state 
responses to Graham and Miller are satisfying the Supreme Court’s mandate. 
A. Timing Questions 
A first question relates to timing in assessing a state’s compliance with the 
Eighth Amendment requirement that it provide a “meaningful opportunity” for 
release. The Court declined in Graham to specify when during the course of a 
juvenile offender’s incarceration states must offer the chance of release in 
nonhomicide cases. Miller similarly did not articulate what type of sentence would 
be an acceptable alternative to LWOP in homicide cases.  
Even prior to Graham, the Court found that the timing of eligibility for release 
bears on the severity of the sentence under Eighth Amendment analysis. In 
Rummel, the prisoner’s eligibility for parole after twelve years was significant to 
the Court’s decision to uphold the sentence against an Eighth Amendment 
challenge.214 In Graham, the Court emphasized the role that a prisoner’s hope for 
release plays in assessing the severity of a sentence.215 A sentence that deprives a 
prisoner of a sense of hope regarding the future is uniquely punitive. The Court 
reasoned that “life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death 
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”216 Although the state does not 
execute the prisoner, “the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable” and “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving 
hope of restoration.”217 The Court stated: 
As one court observed in overturning a life without parole sentence for 
a juvenile defendant, this sentence “means denial of hope; it means that 
good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that 
                                                                                                                 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 213. Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
 214. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1980). 
 215. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the 
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.”218 
 The Court further observed: “Life in prison without the possibility of parole 
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation 
with society, no hope.”219 
As Alice Ristroph has argued, Graham should be understood to mean not only 
that states cannot deny hope to juvenile offenders but also that “the state is not to 
abandon hope for the juvenile’s eventual rehabilitation.”220 In other words, both the 
prisoner’s sense of hope and society’s sense of hope for the prisoner are relevant. 
The state should not “mak[e] the judgment at the outset” to give up on a teenager 
and imprison him for life.221 Rather, the state should allow at least the possibility 
that someone of that age can change and contribute to society. 
At the very least, Graham requires states to give eligible juvenile offenders a 
chance of release before they are expected to die. Otherwise, the sentence fails to 
offer any hope to the prisoner and does not mitigate its severity. Thus, even if a life 
sentence offers the chance of parole, it will violate Graham if release is not 
possible until after a prisoner is expected to die. The Iowa governor’s commutation 
of LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the possibility of parole after sixty 
years falls in this category of inadequate responses to the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment holding.222 Under the governor’s response, prisoners would not be 
eligible for release until their mid-to-late seventies at the earliest, and they may 
well have died in prison before that time. Similarly, a no-parole, term-of-years 
sentence that will imprison a juvenile offender past his life expectancy plainly 
violates Graham.223 
But what about a sentence of thirty or forty years, which would probably allow a 
prisoner the chance of release before death, but which would mean that release 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).  
 219. Id. at 2032. Studies confirm that juvenile offenders serving LWOP or other lengthy 
sentences indeed experience extreme feelings of hopelessness. Negative psychological 
effects of imprisonment typically increase as someone serves a sentence, and then begin to 
reverse as release approaches. John J. Gibbs, The First Cut Is the Deepest: Psychological 
Breakdown and Survival in the Detention Setting, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 97 (Robert 
Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982); Stanton Wheeler, Socialization in Correctional 
Communities, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 697 (1961). For those serving LWOP sentences, the reverse 
effect is not experienced. Moreover, those who enter prison at a young age are likely to 
suffer the most. Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for 
Postprison Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED 33 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul 
eds., 2003); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK 
FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 190 (2012) (“[M]ost adult jails or prisons are ill-
equipped to meet the needs of children or keep them safe. They are much more likely to 
commit suicide in an adult jail than in a juvenile facility.” (citations omitted)). 
 220. Ristroph, supra note 6, at 75. 
 221. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 222. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 223. Several courts have held as much, whereas other courts have held that Graham 
applies only to “life” sentences and not term-of-years sentences, regardless of their length. 
See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
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could not come until quite late in life? How soon before expected death must the 
chance for release come to make the opportunity “meaningful”? This issue arose 
during the litigation of Graham. The petitioner’s brief in Graham referenced 
Colorado law, which prohibits LWOP for juvenile offenders convicted of the most 
serious crimes and makes them eligible for parole after forty years.224 At oral 
argument in Graham, upon questioning from Justice Alito, petitioner’s counsel 
stated that the Colorado statute was “probably . . . constitutional.”225 Justice Alito’s 
dissent referenced this statement: “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the 
imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole. Indeed, 
petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as forty years 
without the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.”226 Justice 
Thomas’s dissent similarly referenced Colorado’s statute and counsel’s statement at 
oral argument.227 However, the majority opinion in Graham did not elaborate on 
the timing issue but simply asserted that states must provide juvenile offenders with 
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” 
Although some might assert that providing the chance for release after forty 
years’ imprisonment fulfills Graham’s mandate, the better view is that a 
“meaningful opportunity” for release means that review should come at a point in 
time that provides the prisoner with the chance to live a meaningful life outside of 
prison. Thus, Graham should not be understood to mean simply that a prisoner 
must have a chance to be released shortly prior to his expected date of death. 
Rather, for the chance of release to be meaningful, review must occur at a point in 
time that will give a prisoner a sense of hope about the future and that reflects 
society’s hope that the prisoner can rejoin society in a meaningful way. A young 
prisoner contemplating spending at least thirty to forty years in prison—a much 
longer span of time than he or she has lived outside of prison—will almost 
certainly experience a profound sense of hopelessness. Such a sentence means 
being incarcerated past the typical childbearing age, past the timeframe in which 
one could start a meaningful career, and past the age in which one could expect 
parents or other former caregivers to still be alive. In contrast, providing a juvenile 
with hope that he or she may someday lead a meaningful life outside of prison will 
encourage efforts at rehabilitation.228 
As noted, a federal judge in Michigan has ordered the state to consider juvenile 
offenders for parole after they have served ten years in prison.229 This timing for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 17, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
 226. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 227. Justice Thomas noted: “In light of the volume of state and federal legislation that 
presently permits life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it would 
be impossible to argue that there is any objective evidence of agreement that a juvenile is 
constitutionally entitled to a parole hearing any sooner than 40 years after conviction.” Id. at 
2057–58 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
 228. Cf. id. at 2032 (majority opinion) (“A young person who knows that he or she has 
no chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible 
individual.”). By giving prisoners a chance of a meaningful life outside of prison, prisons 
can encourage good behavior. 
 229. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. A bill introduced in the U.S. Congress 
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release eligibility would provide prisoners with a sense of hope and would allow 
individuals the chance to live meaningful lives outside of prison. Given Graham’s 
emphasis on adolescent brain development and maturation,230 it would be logical to 
tie the timing of an initial review to when one can expect an individual to have 
obtained a fully mature brain and a more stable character. Brain and character 
maturation typically occurs by the time someone reaches his or her early 
twenties.231 Thus, juvenile offenders could be expected to undergo significant 
change by a ten-year mark. 
Another source of guidance comes from the current draft of the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) for sentencing, which recommends a “second 
look” at juvenile sentences after ten years.232 Under the MPC’s proposed provision, 
an individual serving a prison sentence for a crime committed under the age of 
eighteen would be able to petition a court for a sentence modification after serving 
ten years in prison.233 The MPC draft recommends a second-look procedure for 
most adult offenders as well, and would allow these prisoners to petition the court 
for a sentence modification after serving fifteen years in prison.234 Under both the 
adult and juvenile provisions, the judicial panel (or other judicial decision maker) 
could shorten the sentence at this later point in time if the modified sentence would 
better serve the purposes of sentencing.235 The MPC recommends a shorter time 
frame for review of juvenile offender cases because “adolescents can generally be 
expected to change more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and to a 
greater absolute degree, than older offenders.”236 
Graham and Miller do not resolve whether states can adopt bright-line rules on 
timing for eligibility for release, or whether sentencing courts must have discretion 
to set a particular date for release consideration based on the individual 
                                                                                                                 
would have required states to adopt policies to grant juvenile offenders serving sentences of 
more than fifteen years a meaningful opportunity for parole or supervised release at least 
once during their first fifteen years of incarceration, and at least once every three years 
thereafter. The bill was not enacted. Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 
2011, H.R. 3305, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 230. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 231. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers & Mental Health America as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 
2236778; Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES, June 2004, at 77, 77. 
 232. The American Law Institute (ALI) has been working since 1999 to develop the 
MPC for sentencing. The most recent draft of the MPC was approved by the ALI 
membership at its 2011 Annual Meeting. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 233. Id. § 6.11A(h). 
 234. Id. § 305.6. The one narrow exception to the adult offender second-look provision 
would be in cases where a life-without-parole sentence is the “sole alternative to a death 
sentence.” Id. § 305.6 cmt. (b)(2). 
 235. The goal of such review hearings is to determine “whether the purposes of 
sentencing . . . would better be served by a modified sentence than the prisoner’s completion 
of the original sentence.” Id. § 305.6(4). 
 236. Id. § 6.11A cmt. h. The proposal also recommends absolute caps on juvenile 
sentences that are below adult maximums. Id. § 6.11A cmt. g. 
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circumstances of the offense and offender. Most legislative responses thus far have 
cabined judicial discretion by requiring juvenile offenders to serve lengthy 
mandatory minimum sentences prior to any parole eligibility.237 However, the 
California Supreme Court adopted an individualized approach with respect to 
Graham claims and instructed sentencing courts to consider the particular 
circumstances of the offense and offender in setting a parole eligibility date.238 
Given Miller’s focus on individualized sentencing, and emphasis that life-long 
sentences for juveniles should be “uncommon,” statutes like Pennsylvania’s that 
give judges the option of imposing LWOP or a sentence of thirty-five years to life 
are contrary to the spirit of the decision and may well be unconstitutional. 
It bears noting that while review of a sentence under Graham cannot come too 
late, it also cannot come too early. If the opportunity for release for a juvenile 
offender comes too soon after conviction, the prisoner will not have had a 
meaningful chance to rehabilitate. A number of states have sentence review 
mechanisms that provide for court review of sentences.239 However, if sentence 
review must be sought close in time to sentencing, then it does not provide the sort 
of “second look” procedure contemplated by Graham. Graham requires a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”240 Therefore, there must be an opportunity to seek release after a 
juvenile offender has had enough time to mature and change.241 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. See supra Part II.A. 
 238. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. Another timing issue not resolved by 
Graham and Miller is the length of parole supervision that may follow release. Can a juvenile 
offender released by the parole board be subject to parole supervision for the rest of his or her life? 
Does the Constitution place any limit on the type of parole violations that can justify revocation 
and imprisonment for the remainder of the life sentence? Under existing parole systems, the 
conditions of parole release can be extremely stringent and quite punitive in and of themselves. 
Moreover, a minor and noncriminal misstep such as missing a curfew can land a parolee back in 
prison. Arguably, Graham and Miller bear on these post-release issues.  
 239. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4037(A) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 
(West 2005). For a discussion of state appellate sentencing review, see Daniel E. Wathen, 
Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate 
Review, 40 ME. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1988). Sentencing review under these statutes typically requires 
filing a request shortly after sentencing. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (application 
must be filed within thirty days of sentencing). In Connecticut, the Sentence Review Division 
cannot consider post-sentencing rehabilitation in reviewing the appropriateness of the sentence. 
See Miller v. Warden, No. 556724, 2002 WL 1724044, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 26, 2002). 
 240. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 241. Another problem with coming before the parole board “too early” is that it is not atypical 
for juvenile offenders to have difficulty adjusting to prison in their early years, and they may have 
disciplinary problems as a result. Many individuals convicted as juveniles are placed directly in 
adult prison and they may not yet have the skills to handle the conflicts and threats that occur 
regularly in prison. As a result, they may react by fighting or engaging in other aggressive 
behavior. These problems are compounded if the child is mentally ill or has been exposed to 
trauma. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 219, at 110. Prison officials may react by using 
disciplinary methods such as isolation and restraints, which can further exacerbate the 
child’s difficulty in adjusting to prison life. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, GROWING UP 
LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES 51–52 (2012). 
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A final consideration relating to timing is whether Graham requires that states 
provide only one opportunity for release, or whether periodic review is required. 
Again, Graham is silent on this issue. Parole systems typically provide periodic 
review, although the length of time between reviews differs.242 In recent years, 
some states have increased the length of time between reviews in response to 
complaints by victims about the trauma of repeatedly revisiting the crime.243 
Periodic review is logical in terms of assessing rehabilitation, because prisoners 
mature and reform at different rates, and it is difficult ex ante to predict when 
someone might be ready for release. Moreover, a prisoner’s ability to demonstrate 
rehabilitation may be heavily dependent on the availability of programming within 
prisons. Indeed, many of the juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences were 
excluded from participation in programming because they had no chance of ever 
being released.244 A single review date set early means that some individuals will 
not have had enough time to establish readiness for release. However, a single 
review date set late likely means holding people in prison who present no risk to 
the community. Finally, a single review date creates an all-or-nothing structure for 
the decision maker. In close calls, the best approach may be to defer decision and to 
review the case again after more information can be obtained. In some instances, a 
decision maker might want to see how a prisoner progresses in a particular program 
or toward a specific goal before making a decision on release.245 
In sum, to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, states must provide the 
opportunity for release at a meaningful time. In responding to Graham and Miller, 
states have focused on this timing component of the decisions. Some states have 
plainly fallen short in their responses, whereas other responses are closer to the 
line. These timing questions will no doubt be the subjects of future litigation. States 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. For example, in Massachusetts, inmates serving life sentences who are denied parole 
must be reconsidered at regular intervals not to exceed five years. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-board/frequently-asked
-questions.html. In New York, an inmate denied parole at the parole board interview must be 
allowed to reappear within twenty-four months of the last appearance. See N.Y. State Dep’t 
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, New York State Parole Handbook, NY.GOV, https://
www.parole.ny.gov/intro_handbook.html#h2_27. 
 243. For example, in California prior to 2008, the parole board typically held hearings for 
inmates serving life sentences on an annual basis after the initial term was served. 
Proposition 9 changed the default period between hearings from one year to fifteen years, 
with a minimum period of three years between hearings. See Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 
638 F.3d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2011). In Georgia, the Board of Pardons changed the 
frequency of parole hearings from every three years to up to every eight years for inmates 
serving life sentences. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 247 (2000). 
 244. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AGAINST ALL ODDS: PRISON CONDITIONS FOR YOUTH 
OFFENDERS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES 26–36 
(2012). In addition, regardless of any exclusion policies, some prisons have limited 
rehabilitative programming and long waitlists for programs. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, 
As Rehab Programs Are Cut, Prisons Do Less to Keep Inmates from Returning, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17. 
 245. The Model Penal Code draft recommends periodic review for both adult and 
juvenile offenders. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.11A(h), 305.6(2) (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011). 
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seeking to minimize litigation and the potential for additional resentencings should 
avoid adopting sentencing schemes that deny parole for forty or fifty years. Rather, 
starting periodic review at a ten- or fifteen-year mark is well within constitutional 
limits, consistent with the MPC approach, and gives sufficient time for the offender 
to mature and change before the initial review. 
B. A Realistic Chance of Release 
A second component of the meaningful opportunity requirement relates to the 
likelihood that states will actually grant release, and the criteria used by authorities 
in assessing release. 
The actual likelihood of release bears on the severity of a sentence and is 
relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis. Although the Court in Graham uses the 
phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” several times in the decision,246 
it concludes the opinion by stating: “A State need not guarantee the offender 
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with 
some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”247 Graham 
specifically rejects the view that the possibility of clemency provides an adequate 
chance for release, asserting that clemency for the prisoner is a “remote possibility 
. . . [that] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”248 The Court’s decisions 
in Solem and Rummel likewise reveal that the actual likelihood of release is 
relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis.249 Thus, under Graham, a meaningful 
opportunity for release means a realistic one. 
Regarding the criteria for release, Graham requires that states “give defendants 
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”250 Therefore, an assessment of whether the prisoner 
has matured and rehabilitated must be central to the release decision. A releasing 
authority that relies too heavily on the severity of the initial offense in denying 
release will run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. Graham and Miller take as given 
that the offense is serious. Under Graham, a realistic chance of release must be 
provided even when the juvenile offender was convicted of a violent crime such as 
rape or kidnapping.251 And Miller holds that the judge must have a sentencing 
option that would allow a juvenile convicted of even the most heinous murder 
offense the realistic chance for release.252 Under these decisions, a juvenile 
offender’s chance of release thus must be tied to whether he or she has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2033 (2010). 
 247. Id. at 2034 (emphasis added). 
 248. Id. at 2027. 
 249. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–03 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
280–81 (1980). 
 250. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (emphasis added). 
 251. Id. at 2051–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing a particularly “depraved” case 
to which Graham’s holding applies). 
 252. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that 
under the Court’s holding “[e]ven a 17 1/2-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall 
or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ and must be given a chance to 
persuade a judge to permit his release into society”). 
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“demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”253 The severity of the crime is taken 
into account in determining the original sentence—including the date for parole 
eligibility. Under Graham and Miller, crime severity should not influence an 
assessment of release suitability.254 
Accordingly, under Graham and Miller, rehabilitated juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders must have a realistic chance of release, and judges must have the option 
of imposing such a sentence on homicide offenders. For the most part, state 
legislation and court decisions have not focused on fulfilling this aspect of the 
Court’s mandate.255 Rather, legislatures and courts seem to assume that as long as 
they make juvenile offenders eligible for parole at an appropriate time, existing 
parole board practices will provide a meaningful opportunity for release. Yet, 
absent specific direction, it is far from clear that parole boards will offer a realistic 
chance of release. As has been described, in many states, parole board release rates 
are quite low, and the nature of the offense often drives the decision.256 
To ensure compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate, states should provide 
specific guidance to parole boards about assessment of juvenile offender cases. For 
example, the bill considered last session by the Connecticut legislature instructs the 
parole board to consider a number of factors relating to rehabilitation, including 
whether “the offender has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the 
date of the commission of the crime or crimes.”257 In addition, the board must 
consider whether the individual has contributed “to the welfare of other persons 
through service” and made “efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction, 
trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or 
youth in the adult correctional system.”258 Finally, the proposal specifically states 
that the board should consider “the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult 
correctional system.”259 Thus, this statutory language requires the board to consider 
rehabilitation-related factors, and gives a fair amount of guidance regarding the 
factors relevant to assessing rehabilitation. Despite this helpful guidance, the 
Connecticut proposal also instructs the board to consider whether release would 
adhere to the purposes of sentencing set forth in General Statutes section 
54-300(c)(1)–(4).260 Because the purposes of sentencing include an assessment of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 253. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 254. David Ball asserts that current policy in California allows the parole board to 
“second-guess the jury” by deeming a crime sufficiently serious “to deny suitability for 
parole even when a jury did not.” Ball, supra note 151, at 971. In his view, consistent with 
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, the parole board should not “consider the commitment 
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determining a juvenile offender’s original sentence. The parole suitability question should be 
based on an assessment of rehabilitation—not the nature of the original crime. See id. at 972. 
 255. See supra Part II.A-B.  
 256. See supra notes 151–66 and accompanying text. 
 257. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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the seriousness of the offense,261 this factor may stray too far from the criteria for 
release intended by Graham.  
Louisiana’s new statute also contains rehabilitation-focused factors. However, 
one factor is of concern. The statute states that an individual will be eligible for 
parole consideration only if he or she “has obtained a low-risk level designation 
determined by a validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of 
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.”262 Risk assessments under these 
instruments are often tied to factors that are immutable—such as age at the time of 
offense, nature of the offense, and elementary school maladjustment.263 Thus, this 
requirement is likely to include consideration of factors unrelated to rehabilitation, 
and reduce the chances that a rehabilitated juvenile offender will actually be 
released.  
It bears noting that one cannot conclude based on current parole release rates of 
prisoners convicted of violent crimes whether a particular state’s parole board will 
provide a rehabilitated juvenile offender with a realistic chance for release. Going 
forward, data will need to be collected to determine the release rates of juvenile 
offenders sentenced to long prison terms. Moreover, an analysis of the prisoner’s 
degree of rehabilitation needs to be assessed to determine if parole boards are 
complying with Graham, for Graham requires a realistic chance of release for 
rehabilitated juvenile offenders, not for all juvenile offenders. Over time, trends in 
these cases will emerge, and it may be possible for prisoners to establish that a 
parole board is failing to grant release in an appropriate number of juvenile cases 
involving rehabilitated prisoners.  
In sum, historically, parole boards have not been required to make the 
possibility of parole release realistic for inmates. Thus, simply making juvenile 
offenders eligible for parole under existing practices will not guarantee compliance 
with Eighth Amendment requirements. To help ensure a realistic chance of release 
for rehabilitated juvenile offenders, state legislatures and courts should craft special 
criteria for parole boards to consider in assessing the suitability of these prisoners 
for release. Looking forward, parole boards should know that their decisions with 
respect to juvenile offenders will be subject to increased scrutiny by courts.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 261. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-300(c) (West Supp. 2013) (“[S]entencing should 
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C. Meaningful Hearings 
The third component of the meaningful opportunity requirement relates to the 
procedures employed by the releasing authority in making a release decision. 
Below, this procedural aspect of Graham is explored. 
1. The Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Parole Release 
Hearings 
The Court in Graham explicitly declined to tie its holding to a requirement that 
states make nonhomicide juvenile offenders eligible for parole.264 Rather, likely 
because of the wide variation in parole practices in states around the country, the 
Court instead employed the phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”265 
Although the Court did not elaborate further on the meaning of this phrase, it is 
clear that a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” must encompass the concept 
that states provide meaningful consideration of a prisoner’s suitability for release. 
Otherwise, one cannot be confident that an inmate’s maturity and rehabilitation 
have been accurately assessed. Thus, a state’s existing parole system will comply 
with the Eighth Amendment only if it actually uses a meaningful process for 
considering release. In other words, the parole board must provide more than pro 
forma consideration. In addition, Graham’s meaningful opportunity mandate leaves 
room for states to use release mechanisms other than parole to comply with the 
decision. 
Thus, although Graham is typically viewed as a case that places substantive 
limits on punishment, it is also a case about procedure. Richard Bierschbach is one 
of the few scholars to consider the procedural aspect of the Graham decision.266 He 
explains that Graham allows “the most severe form of punishment for juvenile 
offenders—life in prison—[to be] imposed, but only if it is accompanied by the 
procedural protection of parole.”267 “Parole thus conceptually severs Graham from 
Roper, Atkins, and other classic proportionality cases on which it relied for much of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 264. Instead, the Court requires states to provide prisoners with a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release” and provides that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to 
explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2030 (2010). 
 265. Id. at 2016. 
 266. See Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1748. Professor Bierschbach argues that Graham 
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its doctrinal support. Despite their obvious similarities, none of those cases linked 
the constitutionality of punishment to a procedural rule.”268 
There are several possible frameworks for considering the process required by 
Graham. First, Graham could be viewed as creating a right to a hearing with 
procedural protections that stem from the Eighth Amendment. The Court 
recognized in Graham that the possibility of release bears on an assessment of the 
severity of the sentence, and a sentence without a meaningful chance of release is 
unduly severe for nonhomicide juvenile offenders.269 Thus, as a substantive matter 
under the Eighth Amendment, the sentence must allow a meaningful and realistic 
chance for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. To satisfy 
this right to the chance of release, states must provide meaningful consideration of 
the individual circumstances of the prisoner. In this way, the procedural rights 
needed to ensure meaningful consideration of a prisoner for release can be viewed 
as originating from the Eighth Amendment. 
Prior cases have recognized that certain procedural rights flow from the Eighth 
Amendment. Bierschbach observes that the “interaction of substance and procedure 
that drives the constitutional significance of parole” makes Graham resemble the 
Court’s decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio.270 In 
Woodson v. North Carolina,271 the Court held that a mandatory death penalty 
statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not allow “particularized 
consideration” of the circumstances of the case.272 Similarly, in Lockett v. Ohio,273 
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires states in death penalty cases to 
allow broad consideration of any mitigating factors regarding the offense or 
offender.274 These cases have emphasized the need for enhanced procedural 
protections to ensure that reliable judgments are made about whether to impose the 
uniquely severe penalty of death.275 
Although scholars have described Woodson and Lockett as requiring “super due 
process” in the capital context,276 the cases invoke the Eighth Amendment rather 
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than procedural due process analysis as the basis for the holdings.277 Miller relies 
on Woodson and Lockett in prohibiting mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders, 
and itself encompasses a procedural holding grounded in the Eighth Amendment.278 
Indeed, Miller shows the Court’s willingness to find that Eighth Amendment 
procedural rights attach outside of the capital context. Although a parole hearing 
does not determine if a juvenile offender will live or die, its outcome is of profound 
significance to the prisoner: denial of parole means the prisoner will die in prison. 
Thus, drawing upon the Court’s prior jurisprudence, one could view the Eighth 
Amendment as requiring certain procedural protections at parole hearings to ensure 
that boards give meaningful consideration to the release decision and make reliable 
judgments. 
Alternatively, one could view Graham instead as triggering procedural due 
process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment for juvenile offenders at 
parole hearings. As discussed, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Greenholtz, 
minimal due process protections do not attach to parole release hearings unless 
state statutes create a liberty interest in release, and many states have chosen to 
avoid constitutional constraints by creating purely discretionary parole regimes.279 
Graham’s Eighth Amendment requirement that states provide a “meaningful” and 
“realistic” chance of release could be seen as creating a liberty interest for juvenile 
offenders in release—regardless of whether applicable state statutes have otherwise 
created such an interest. After Graham, release decisions for juvenile offenders 
serving life sentences are no longer purely discretionary for states. Rather, 
prisoners have a certain entitlement: although they are not guaranteed release, they 
are entitled to a realistic chance of release if they demonstrate maturity and 
rehabilitation. This entitlement could be viewed as creating a liberty interest. Under 
this framework, one would apply traditional procedural due process analysis to 
determine what procedures Graham requires. Indeed, although the Supreme Court 
had not used the phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” prior to 
Graham, the Court has frequently used the term “meaningful opportunity” in 
reference to procedural due process requirements.280 
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Somewhat analogous to Graham are the Court’s decisions addressing the 
procedures required for sanity and clemency hearings of death-sentenced prisoners, 
which have applied due process analysis. In Ford v. Wainwright,281 the Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from inflicting the death 
penalty upon a prisoner who is insane, and concluded that Florida’s procedures for 
determining the sanity of a death row prisoner had been inadequate. In detailing the 
procedures required for sanity hearings, the Ford plurality drew upon both procedural 
due process cases and Eighth Amendment precedent such as Woodson.282 However, 
Justice Powell’s concurrence, which controls, analyzed the matter explicitly under the 
due process clause.283 In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,284 the Court 
considered whether death-sentenced inmates are entitled to any procedural 
protections in clemency determinations. A plurality of the Court held that they were 
not.285 However, a concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor concluded that certain 
minimal due process protections attach to clemency proceedings because a prisoner 
under a sentence of death has a continuing interest in life.286 Thus, relying on Ford 
and Woodard, courts might use procedural due process analysis in considering the 
scope of Graham’s mandate. 
In sum, Graham plainly has a procedural component—states must provide 
meaningful consideration of a prisoner’s suitability for release. Less immediately 
apparent is how courts will analyze Graham’s procedural requirements when faced 
with claims from prisoners alleging that they were denied meaningful hearings under 
state parole rules. Courts might use an Eighth Amendment framework for considering 
such claims, or they could turn to traditional procedural due process analysis. 
Considering the Eighth Amendment as the source of procedural rights for release 
hearings could lead to a more robust view of those rights. Eighth Amendment 
procedural rules, as they have developed in the capital context, are focused on the 
importance of reliable judgments and on the need for individual consideration of the 
offense and offender. Courts often find heightened protections attach given the 
severity of the punishment at issue.287 
In contrast, under a procedural due process approach, courts will likely start by 
looking at existing due process requirements for parole hearings. Historically, even 
where a state statute has created a liberty interest, courts have required only very 
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minimal process for parole release decisions. For example, in Greenholtz, the 
Supreme Court found that Nebraska’s informal hearing process provided adequate 
process, and a formal evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.288 In addition, the Court 
refused to require the parole board to provide a written statement of the evidence 
relied upon in reaching a decision and instead found that a simple communication of 
reasons for the parole denial sufficed.289 More recently, in Swarthout v. Cooke,290 the 
Court held that due process was satisfied when California lifers “were allowed to 
speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded 
access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was 
denied.”291 Cooke reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that due process requires 
“some evidence” supporting the parole board’s decision denying release.292  
Courts considering the process required by Graham might distinguish these prior 
parole cases and find that more process is due to juvenile offenders serving life 
sentences. As discussed further below, this category of prisoners faces unique 
challenges in presenting an effective case for release, and the interest at stake—
whether one will be released before death—is serious. Nevertheless, if courts use due 
process analysis, it may be an uphill battle for juvenile offenders to secure greater 
procedural protections than those required for adult offenders in jurisdictions where 
due process protections attach.  
In any event, regardless of whether one views release hearing procedures as 
governed by Eighth Amendment or procedural due process analysis, the core 
requirement of Graham is that parole boards give juvenile offenders meaningful 
hearings. As discussed below, there are several aspects of current parole practices in 
many states that threaten to deny juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. Before discussing these problematic parole practices, I explore the special 
challenges facing juvenile offenders seeking release. 
2. The Challenges of Presenting a Case for Release 
An assessment of the procedures necessary to ensure meaningful hearings for 
juvenile offenders requires consideration of the special challenges facing juvenile 
offenders in seeking release. 
Presenting a persuasive case for release is a difficult endeavor, especially for a 
prisoner convicted of a violent offense. Juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences 
will tend to face particular obstacles in presenting an effective case for release. The 
first challenge is that many will lack the self-confidence, education, and 
organizational skills required to make a persuasive presentation. Some of these 
individuals have been incarcerated since they were thirteen or fourteen years old and 
thus grew up in prison.293 Many had limited education prior to incarceration294 and 
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have not had opportunities within prison to develop critical skills.295 Some were 
victims of trauma and abuse before their arrests296 and have been further victimized 
in prison.297 Some suffer from depression or other mental illnesses.298 
A second challenge is the prisoner’s access to relevant mitigating information. 
An individual may not have a clear memory of his or her childhood, particularly if 
it was marked by exposure to stress and trauma.299 Some information—such as the 
prisoner’s prenatal exposure to drugs—may not be known at all by the prisoner. 
The individual, having grown up in prison, may have lost ties to family members or 
others who could help supply relevant details. In addition, an individual may not 
accurately remember the crime itself, especially if mental illness or drug use was 
involved. Extensive investigation of a person’s background is necessary to present 
an accurate picture to the releasing authority, and usually an evaluation by a mental 
health expert will be required.300 A psychiatrist or psychologist could provide 
insight about the ways in which the inmate’s youth or mental illness may have 
contributed to the crime, could speak to how an inmate has changed over the years, 
and could assess the degree of risk he or she currently presents to the 
community.301 Yet a prisoner detained since childhood cannot be expected to 
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Functional Neuroanatomical Correlates of the Effects of Stress on Memory, 8 J. TRAUMATIC 
STRESS 527, 528 (1995); J. Douglas Bremner & Meena Narayan, The Effects of Stress on 
Memory and the Hippocampus Throughout the Life Cycle: Implications for Childhood 
Development and Aging, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 871, 873 (1998); Gary W. Evans & 
Michelle A. Schamberg, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, and Adult Working Memory, 
106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 6545, 6546 (2009). 
 300. In the capital context, advocates have recognized the importance of presenting 
mental health evaluations that are informed by an extensive investigation of the client’s life 
history. See Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History 
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 963, 966–74 (2008). 
 301. Id. at 974–76. 
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muster the resources for a thorough investigation and mental health evaluation on 
his or her own. 
A third challenge in presenting the case for release is articulating multiple, and 
at times conflicting, narratives to the decision maker. On the one hand, the decision 
maker will want to hear that the prisoner acknowledges the seriousness of the 
offense, takes full responsibility for it, and feels genuine remorse.302 On the other 
hand, mitigating circumstances regarding the offense are highly relevant to an 
assessment of the seriousness of the crime, and the decision maker needs to be 
persuaded that the prisoner has rehabilitated.303 But it is difficult for someone to 
focus on remorse for a terrible act while at the same time cataloging one’s 
accomplishments. And it is extremely hard for a person to express remorse and take 
responsibility for the crime at the same time as he or she suggests mitigation 
regarding an offense. Yet in many cases involving those convicted as juveniles it 
will be particularly important to present mitigating evidence regarding the offense 
itself, as the offense will often involve circumstances demonstrating the juvenile’s 
reduced culpability.  
A final challenge is that juvenile offenders who have been detained for many 
years are typically isolated, and many will lack connections and support from the 
community. This isolation makes it more difficult for them to present a solid 
release plan to the decision maker, and it means that they are less likely to have 
individuals in the community advocate for their release.304 Parole boards need to be 
persuaded that the juvenile offender—who has never lived in the community as an 
adult—will be able to successfully reintegrate into society. A release plan that 
shows who will support an individual upon his release, where he will live, and how 
he will find employment can be quite persuasive. Failure to provide such a plan 
may be fatal to the effort to obtain release. 
3. Parole Release Procedures and Meaningful Hearings 
As discussed below, the survey of parole board procedures reveals several areas 
of concern about existing practices. In particular, many states deny prisoners the 
chance to present the case for release in person before the decision maker and 
prevent prisoners from seeing and rebutting key information relied upon by the 
decision maker.305 Moreover, many states place strict limits on the role that a 
prisoner’s counsel can play in the process.306 Given the special challenges facing 
juvenile offenders in presenting an effective case for release, these procedures 
threaten to deny meaningful hearings for these prisoners.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 302. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to 
Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 512–26 (2008) (discussing the role of 
remorse at parole hearings). 
 303. See id. at 511–12 (examining the factors considered by parole boards in assessing a 
prisoner’s suitability for release). 
 304. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 244, at 41 (describing the isolation of 
juveniles serving LWOP sentences). 
 305. See supra notes 176–87, 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 188–95 and accompanying text. 
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a. In-Person Hearing Before Decision Makers 
The survey of parole boards shows that many states do not allow the prisoner to 
appear in person before the decision maker.307 In several states, parole decisions are 
made based on “file review,” and there is no interaction at all between the prisoner 
and the board.308 In other states, the person who interacts with the prisoner is an 
employee of the parole board, and not someone with decision-making power.309 At 
hearings in some of these states, the prisoner is absent and the decision makers 
interact directly with other key players—including the victim and prosecutor.310 In 
other instances, the decision maker interacts with the prisoner, but does so via 
videoconference or telephone.311 
Historically, where no liberty interest is created by state statute, states have been 
free to deny in-person parole hearings to prisoners. In states where a liberty interest 
exists, case law does not establish whether due process requires an in-person 
hearing for adult offenders—as the systems upheld by the Supreme Court in Cooke 
and Greenholtz both allowed inmates to appear in person.312 But regardless of the 
law governing hearings for adult offenders, a strong argument can be made that 
states should allow juvenile offenders to appear in person before decision makers to 
ensure compliance with Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement.313 
                                                                                                                 
 
 307. See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text. 
 308. Alabama and North Carolina. 
 309.  See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 312. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) (stating inmates were 
“allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them”); 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (stating 
inmate was “permitted to appear before the Board and present letters and statements on his 
own behalf”). Prior to Greenholtz, the Second Circuit rejected a due process challenge to the 
New York system that denied in-person hearings before the decision makers. Zurak v. 
Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Although a personal interview might provide the 
inmate with a better opportunity to present his case to the Board, we think that, under all the 
circumstances, the inmate has sufficient opportunity to present the relevant facts through the 
parole officer and by his own submission of any information helpful to his cause.”).  
  Lower courts have generally rejected due process challenges to the use of 
videoconferencing at parole release and revocation hearings. See, e.g., Wilkins v. 
Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding no due process violation 
where videoconferencing technology used for witness testimony at parole revocation 
proceeding); Pappas v. Ky. Parole Bd., 156 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
that videoconferencing in a parole release hearing does not violate due process). In some 
jurisdictions, courts have found that in-person parole release hearings are statutorily 
required. See Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
federal statute requires prisoners to be physically present at federal parole hearings, and 
videoconferencing does not suffice). 
 313. Allowing a prisoner to appear before the decision maker has an added benefit: it 
fosters a sense of legitimacy in the system. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
3–7 (1990) (arguing procedural justice is a central component of how individuals make 
judgments about the legitimacy of authorities). If prisoners feel release decisions will be 
fairly assessed, they are more likely to comply with prison rules and work toward obtaining 
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The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be 
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,”314 and 
written submissions are an “unrealistic option” for individuals “who lack the 
educational attainment necessary to write effectively.”315 In addition, 
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; 
they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the 
decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where 
credibility and veracity are at issue . . . written submissions are a 
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.316 
The Court has recognized similar deficiencies with second-hand presentations of 
information to decision makers.317 
These concerns are certainly present with respect to parole hearings for juvenile 
offenders. As outlined above, juvenile offenders face unique challenges in seeking 
release at parole hearings. Denial of an in-person hearing is particularly 
problematic for juvenile offenders since prisoners detained since childhood will 
often “lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively,”318 and are 
likely to be much more capable of expressing themselves orally. In addition, under 
Graham, the parole board must determine the extent of a juvenile offender’s 
rehabilitation. Assessing the character and credibility of the prisoner is central to 
determining if he or she has truly rehabilitated. A written submission by the 
prisoner, or a second-hand summary from a third party, simply cannot convey the 
same amount of information as a direct interaction.  
A telephone or videoconference hearing does allow direct interaction between 
the prisoner and decision maker, but it does not permit the same level of interaction 
as an in-person hearing. Indeed, in the immigration context, scholars have found 
that the use of videoconferencing for an asylum hearing reduces the chance that an 
applicant will be granted relief.319 Given the challenges that juvenile offenders may 
face in expressing themselves, and Graham’s mandate that release decisions focus 
                                                                                                                 
rehabilitation. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social 
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 
217–22 (2008) (noting that a person’s views regarding the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system influence the likelihood that he or she will comply with the law).  
 314. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970).  
 315. Id. at 269. 
 316. Id.; see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979) (“[W]ritten 
submissions are a particularly inappropriate way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story 
from a fabricated tall tale.”). 
 317. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269.  
 318. Id. 
 319. Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line 
Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
259, 271 (2008) (finding that videoconferencing roughly doubles the chances that an asylum 
applicant will be denied relief). The authors argue that videoconferencing “changes the 
‘adjudicative quality’ of the Immigration Judge’s decision by fundamentally altering the 
perception of the testimony.” Id. at 266. Among other problems, use of videoconferencing 
prevents eye contact between the applicant and the decision maker, and undermines the 
ability of the applicant to build an emotional connection with the judge. See id. at 268–69. 
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on assessing rehabilitation, telephone or videoconference hearings may not provide 
a meaningful hearing. 
b. Access to Information 
The survey establishes that a majority of states do not give prisoners the right to 
see significant information relied upon by the decision maker.320 Although some 
jurisdictions ensure full access to information provided by the prosecutor and 
victim, other states prevent prisoners from seeing some or all of this information.321 
In addition, many states prevent prisoners from seeing the conclusions and 
recommendations of mental health professionals who examined them for the 
board.322 
The ability to see and rebut information relied upon by a decision maker is a 
crucial part of ensuring a fair hearing.323 Without knowledge of the information 
relied upon by the parole board, the prisoner cannot dispute its accuracy or provide 
an alternative account. A bar on information provided by the victim and prosecutor 
prevents the prisoner from rebutting descriptions of the crime or other adverse 
information that may be crucially important to the decision maker. Moreover, 
mental health evaluations could contain erroneous information that has a major 
influence on the release decision. Finally, virtually all boards rely on summaries of 
information regarding the prisoner compiled for the hearing by either department of 
correction or board employees.324 This information too might contain inaccuracies. 
Giving prisoners access to the information on which the decision makers rely is an 
important component of ensuring a meaningful hearing.325 
                                                                                                                 
 
 320. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 323. In other contexts, courts have held that due process requires the chance to rebut 
adverse information. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 264 (1987) 
(“We conclude that minimum due process for the employer in this context requires notice of 
the employee’s allegations, notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence, an 
opportunity to submit a written response, and an opportunity to meet with the investigator 
and present statements from rebuttal witnesses.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 
(1972) (stating that due process requires “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him” 
at revocation proceeding and the chance to confront witnesses). 
 324. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 325. Parole boards may try to justify the lack of disclosure on safety grounds. However, 
some jurisdictions do allow inmate access to victim and prosecutor information, and thus 
apparently have not found these concerns to trump the other interests at stake. Victims and 
prosecutors can choose not to disclose information to the board that they do not want shared 
with the inmate. 
  In states where due process protections attach to parole release hearings, courts are 
split on whether access to institutional files is required. See Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 
694 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1982) (collecting cases and stating that the relevant inquiry 
should be whether “the combination of procedures available to the parole candidate is 
sufficient to minimize the risk that a decision will be based on incorrect information”).  
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c. Role of Counsel 
The survey demonstrates that some states do not allow attorneys for prisoners to 
have a meaningful role in the parole release process. For example, six states do not 
consider attorney input at all in making a release decision,326 and fourteen states do 
not permit an attorney to be present for the inmate’s interview or hearing.327 Only 
ten states responding to the survey appoint counsel for indigent prisoners in any 
cases at all,328 and two of these states restrict appointment of counsel to instances 
where the inmate cannot understand the proceedings.329 Even if counsel is 
provided, the funding may be extremely limited. For example, in California, 
attorneys appointed for “lifer” hearings are paid a maximum of $400 for a case.330  
The role of counsel at ordinary parole release hearings is not surprising, given 
existing due process jurisprudence. The due process clause requires the 
appointment of counsel in only a narrow range of cases.331 Even when courts have 
found that due process rights attach to parole release hearings, they have not 
required appointment of counsel.332 Moreover, courts have rejected due process 
challenges to restrictions on the involvement of even retained counsel at parole 
release hearings.333 
Appointing counsel for indigent juvenile offenders would go a long way toward 
ensuring a meaningful hearing for juvenile offenders. As discussed above, juvenile 
offenders often lack skills essential to presenting an effective case for release.334 
Given their confinement and lack of resources, these prisoners cannot undertake the 
extensive investigation of their backgrounds and offenses that is the basis for a 
persuasive presentation. Counsel could undertake this investigation and also retain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 326. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 330. Katera Estrada Rutledge, Successful Parole Consideration Hearings: The Basic 
Handbook for the Life Prisoner, RUTLEDGE & RUTLEDGE (April 2012), 
http://www.rutledgeattorneys.com/pages/content/13044.  
 331. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2011). 
 332. Currie v. Hill, No. C 11–6315 PJH (PR), 2012 WL 5340930, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2012) (finding no due process right to counsel for California parole release hearing).  
 333. In Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit upheld the Connecticut 
Parole Board’s restriction on the involvement of counsel. The court reasoned:  
The justification advanced by the Board for excluding counsel or counsel-substitute 
from the hearing itself is quite reasonable: The purpose of the hearing in the 
Connecticut system is to enable the members personally to speak with and observe 
the inmate, to determine his attitude towards his crime, readiness for parole and the 
like. The members feel that this can best be achieved by hearing the inmate’s own 
words, unguided by the presence or promptings of counsel. We find that the state’s 
interest in excluding persons other than the inmate from the hearings outweighs the 
“need for and usefulness” to the inmate of having such a representative, despite the 
inmate’s concededly great interest in the decision being made. 
Id. at 84. 
 334. See supra notes 240–45 and accompanying text. 
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a mental health expert in appropriate cases.335 In addition, counsel could help a 
prisoner navigate the difficulty one encounters in simultaneously expressing 
remorse and mitigation. Given the severity of the crimes, it will be necessary at 
hearings to confront the circumstance of the offense and explain how the inmate’s 
youth and other factors at the time of the crime mitigate culpability. Counsel could 
focus on these issues, while the inmate can express remorse and the desire to atone.  
Some parole boards take the view that counsel interferes with the board’s ability 
to connect directly with the prisoner and assess whether he or she is genuinely 
committed to change.336 Certainly, it is important for the prisoner to speak directly 
to the decision maker. A decision maker needs to be persuaded by the prisoner that 
he or she is truly remorseful and reformed.337 But the presence of counsel need not 
interfere with the client’s direct communication with the board. Counsel could play 
an important role in investigating, collecting, and presenting factual information so 
that the release decision is based on a full presentation of the relevant evidence. 
The prisoner could focus on a personal statement for the board.338 
The bill considered in Connecticut during the last legislative session provides a 
possible model regarding the appointment of counsel in juvenile cases.339 Under the 
proposal, the parole board would appoint counsel for indigent juvenile offenders 
twelve months prior to the parole release hearing.340 Appointed counsel would then 
                                                                                                                 
 
 335. See Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating 
Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 397–410 (2012) (discussing the 
mitigating circumstances present in many juvenile offender cases and counsel’s role in collecting 
this evidence). 
 336. Holup, 544 F.2d at 84.  
 337. There are, of course, dangers in making decisions based on an assessment of remorse. 
See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the 
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1469, 1520 (2002) (challenging the notion 
that judges can truly interpret the emotional state of juvenile offenders and questioning “the 
validity of remorse as a predictor of future character”).  
 338. Rhode Island recognizes the separate roles that counsel and the inmate can play and 
the ways in which these roles can complement each other. The Parole Board’s website states: 
Inmates do not need to be represented at the initial parole hearing or at any 
reconsideration hearing. Many inmates do choose to have legal representation 
when they are uncomfortable speaking on their own behalf. Others choose to 
have legal representation because they believe that there are mitigating 
circumstances that an attorney could better explain to the Parole Board. Be 
advised that even if the inmate is represented by an attorney, the inmate will 
still have to answer questions from the Parole Board. While the Parole Board 
does allow attorneys to be present at hearings, the Board does not allow 
attorneys to speak for the inmate. The Parole Board wants to weigh the 
inmate’s insight and level of remorse and they will only be able to do so by 
hearing directly from the inmate. Having an attorney present does not provide 
the inmate with a better chance of getting a positive parole decision. 
State of R.I. Parole Bd. & Sex Offender Cmty. Notification Unit, Frequently Asked 
Questions, RI.GOV, http://www.paroleboard.ri.gov/faq/. 
 339. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013). 
 340. Id. § 1(f)(3). A limitation in the Connecticut proposal is that it would allow the 
Board of Pardons and Paroles to continue its existing (and longstanding) practice of 
preventing counsel from speaking at the parole release hearing. See id. (allowing the 
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have sufficient time to investigate and develop mitigating evidence, retain a mental 
health expert, and assist the inmate in preparing a release plan.  
In sum, existing parole board restrictions on the role of the prisoner’s counsel 
are problematic. Boards should rethink their policies on attorney involvement in 
order to ensure meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders. 
d. Notice, Recording, Statement of Reasons for Decision, and Review 
In addition to the procedures discussed above, several other procedures are 
important to ensuring meaningful hearings. First, releasing authorities should 
provide adequate notice to prisoners of the date of a hearing so that prisoners and 
their attorneys can adequately prepare.341 Second, to enable review of the decision, 
parole boards should record hearings and provide a statement of reasons for the 
decision.342 Notice, recording, and a statement of reasons are core requirements of a 
meaningful hearing recognized by courts in many other contexts.343 Indeed, notice 
of parole hearings is already required in many jurisdictions, and some parole boards 
currently record hearings and provide statements of reasons.344 
Providing a mechanism for direct review of parole board decisions involving 
juvenile offenders would help ensure that these prisoners receive a meaningful 
opportunity for release. Allowing appellate review of a parole board’s finding of 
unsuitability is critical to enforcing Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement 
because it would allow reversal of decisions that were not made in a meaningful or 
accurate manner. In addition, allowing appellate review would promote greater 
consistency in decisions by the board and would help foster development and 
                                                                                                                 
offender to speak but limiting counsel to submitting reports and other documents); see also 
Holup, 544 F.2d at 84–85 (upholding Connecticut’s practice of preventing counsel from 
participating at parole hearings). 
 341. Notice was provided in Cooke and Greenholtz and thus was not explicitly at issue in 
those cases. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam); Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979). The Court’s decision in 
Cooke implies that notice is required if due process protections attach. See Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 
at 862. 
 342. As with the issue of notice, a statement of reasons was provided in Cooke and 
Greenholtz. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5. Again, the Court’s decision 
in Cooke implies that a statement of reasons is required if due process protections attach. See 
Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862. 
 343. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 271 (1970) (requiring “timely and 
adequate notice” and for the decision maker to “state the reasons for his determination and 
indicate the evidence he relied on”). 
 344. For example, Massachusetts issues written parole release decisions for “lifer 
hearings”—those involving inmates sentenced to life with the chance of parole for second-
degree murder. Notice is provided prior to hearings, and they are recorded by audio and 
videotape. Second Degree Lifer Parole Hearing Process, supra note 136. In California, 
notice is provided for “lifer hearings” and written transcripts of hearings are available. CAL. 
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHABILITATION, PAROLE SUITABILITY HEARING HANDBOOK 11 (2010), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Victim_Services/docs/BPHHandbook.pdf. In its post-
Graham legislation, Louisiana enacted a requirement that the panel deciding whether to 
release a juvenile offender “render specific findings of fact in support of its decision.” 
LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 15:574.4(d)(3) (West Supp. 2013). 
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refinement of the meaningful opportunity requirement. Indeed, appellate review 
can be viewed as an essential ingredient of Graham’s meaningful opportunity 
requirement itself. Part of what makes a process meaningful is the ability to force 
decision makers to justify their decisions and to be able to challenge these decisions 
before another body.345  
1. Other Procedural Models 
As discussed, existing parole procedures in many states may fail to ensure 
meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders. As states look to modify existing 
practices to comply with Graham and Miller, they may draw upon procedures used 
for different types of hearings. Below, several possible procedural models are 
considered. 
a. Parole Revocation Hearings 
Some of the procedures already used by parole boards at parole revocation 
hearings provide a possible model for states to use for Graham hearings. In 
Morrissey v. Brewer,346 the Supreme Court held that minimal due process rights 
attach to a decision to revoke parole. The Court required:  
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to 
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the 
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers 
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the 
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.347 
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,348 the Court applied the same standards with respect to 
probation revocation proceedings. The Court in Gagnon also found that a parolee 
or probationer facing revocation has a qualified right to appointed counsel.349  
                                                                                                                 
 
 345. Even absent a statutory right to appeal the parole decision, prisoners denied parole 
could assert in court that their sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because they were 
not provided a meaningful opportunity for release. However, a statutory right to appeal is 
preferable for the reasons described, and given the procedural and jurisdictional hurdles that 
prisoners may encounter in attempting to bring such an Eighth Amendment challenge. 
 346. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
 347. Id. at 489. 
 348. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
 349. Id. at 790. The right attaches if there is a substantial issue regarding whether the 
alleged violation occurred or, even if it is clear that the violation occurred, there are 
“substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation 
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.” 
Id. 
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Thus, because of these due process requirements, parole boards already have 
procedures in place for appointment of counsel for at least some revocation 
proceedings. In addition, boards must have procedures regarding written notice of 
revocation hearings, disclosure of evidence to parolees, testimony of witnesses at 
hearings, and written statements of reasons for decisions. Applying some of these 
same procedural protections to parole release hearings for juvenile offenders would 
be a relatively straightforward task. 
b. Psychiatric Review Boards 
Psychiatric review boards provide another possible procedural model for release 
hearings for juvenile offenders. These boards periodically review patients detained 
pursuant to findings of not guilty by reason of insanity to determine if they can be 
released without causing danger to the community.350 As with hearings under 
Graham, the hearings by the psychiatric review board consider whether someone 
should be released from confinement—usually after a lengthy period of time. At 
issue at both types of hearings is whether someone has changed since the time of an 
offense and can be safely released. Moreover, like the psychiatric review hearings, 
juvenile offender hearings will often involve the consideration of mental health 
information. 
States use a variety of procedures to review the suitability for release of those 
found not guilty by reason of insanity. For example, in Connecticut, detailed 
statutory provisions govern the procedures of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board. The person responsible for psychiatric care for the patient must submit a 
report to the board every six months, and the board must hold a hearing to review 
the suitability of patients for discharge at least every two years.351 The patient has 
the right to appear at all proceedings before the board and, if indigent, to have 
counsel appointed.352 Prior to a hearing, “the board, acquittee and state’s attorney 
may each choose a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the acquittee.”353 The 
acquittee and state’s attorney have the right to examine any documents considered 
by the board.354 The hearing must be open to the public,355 a record must be kept,356 
and an order of the board may be appealed to the court.357 
Substantially more procedural protections attach to psychiatric review hearings 
than to parole release hearings, despite some of the similarities between these types 
                                                                                                                 
 
 350. Carolyn Alexander, Oregon’s Psychiatric Security Review Board: Trouble in 
Paradise, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 9–13 (1998); Deborah C. Scott, Howard V. Zonana & 
Marjorie A. Getz, Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut’s Psychiatric Security 
Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 980, 981–82 (1990). 
 351. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-585 to -586 (West 2006). 
 352. Id. § 17a-596(d) (West Supp. 2013). 
 353. Id. § 17a-596(a). 
 354. Id. § 17a-596(d). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. § 17a-596(g). 
 357. Id. § 17a-597 (West 2006). 
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of proceedings.358 States can look to the procedures utilized at psychiatric hearings 
as a possible model for Graham compliance. 
c. Court-Based Models 
Although most states thus far have focused on making juvenile offenders 
eligible for parole as the means for compliance with Graham and Miller, the 
meaningful opportunity for release need not be provided through a parole board 
process at all. Instead, states could consider a sentence modification mechanism 
that would allow juvenile offenders to petition a court for resentencing and 
release.359 
Currently, in most state systems, there is no mechanism for the court to 
reevaluate a sentence after a period of time.360 However, as discussed above, the 
current draft of the Model Penal Code for sentencing recommends such a “second 
look” procedure for adult and juvenile offenders.361 Under the MPC’s proposal, an 
individual serving a prison sentence for a crime committed under the age of 
eighteen would be able to petition a court for a sentence modification after serving 
ten years in prison, and the judge could shorten the sentence at this later point in 
time if the modified sentence would better serve the purposes of sentencing.362 
A court-based sentence modification procedure could certainly provide a 
meaningful opportunity for release within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment.363 There are some advantages to a court-based approach. Judges 
                                                                                                                 
 
 358. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78–79 (1992). An individual found not guilty 
by reason of insanity is “entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer 
dangerous.” Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, unlike inmates governed by a 
discretionary parole regime, committed acquittees have an entitlement to release based on 
certain criteria.  
 359. For more on judicial sentence modification, see generally Cecelia Klingele, 
Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a 
Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465 (2010), and Margaret 
Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second Look” and Other Sentence 
Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859 
(2011). 
 360. Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences in 
Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003); Klingele, supra note 359, at 498. In some 
jurisdictions, sentence modification is possible but only with the government’s consent. See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-39(b) (West 2012) (requiring the consent of prosecutor 
for modification of sentence longer than three years); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (resentencing 
possible, upon government motion, based on prisoner’s substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another). Wisconsin and Maryland have sentence 
modification procedures that do not rely on the prosecutor’s motion. In Wisconsin, 
postsentencing rehabilitation is not a ground for sentence modification. See Klingele, supra 
note 359, at 507. In Maryland, a sentence modification motion must be filed within ninety 
days of sentencing, but judges can wait up to five years to act on the motions. Id. at 503.  
 361. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.11A(h), 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2011). 
 362. Id. § 6.11A(h). 
 363. The MPC proposal leaves many procedural matters to the states, and thus adoption 
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generally have no occasion to take a second look at sentences that they have 
previously imposed, and they typically do not come face-to-face with someone who 
is many years into a lengthy prison sentence.364 A second-look hearing before a 
judge would expose the judge to a story of rehabilitation and could make the judge 
more likely to believe that rehabilitation is possible in future cases. In addition, the 
hearing may make the meaning of lengthy prison sentences more concrete to the 
judge. Hence, the judge may be less inclined in future cases to impose a lifelong 
sentence with no opportunity for review.  
On the other hand, precisely because judges are not used to taking a second look 
at sentences, they may be more reluctant to alter previously imposed sentences, 
even in the face of compelling accounts of rehabilitation.365 Parole boards are used 
to letting at least some people out of prison and view themselves as having 
expertise in making judgments about who has been reformed and should be 
released. Although parole boards may be risk adverse, they do actually release 
some prisoners. Judges, on the other hand, are not used to making this sort of back-
end sentencing decision. Nevertheless, judges do make decisions about pretrial 
release, and about whether to place someone in prison at all. They are thus called 
upon to make decisions about whether an individual can be safely released into the 
community. A “second look” sentencing assessment would not be entirely foreign 
to a judge. 
It appears that only three states currently have court-based second-look 
procedures in place for juvenile offenders.366 In 1995, the Oregon legislature 
enacted a second-look procedure.367 This reform followed legislation in 1994 that 
created mandatory transfer laws and mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile 
offenders. The second-look procedure applies to individuals who committed crimes 
under the age of eighteen and were sentenced to more than twenty-four months 
imprisonment following transfer to adult court.368 Under the procedure, the court 
must hold a hearing when the juvenile offender has served half of the sentence.369 
The Oregon statute lays out detailed requirements regarding the nature of the 
second-look hearing. Notice of the hearing must be provided to relevant parties, the 
hearing must be recorded and open to the public, and indigent prisoners have the 
                                                                                                                 
of the proposal would not automatically provide a meaningful hearing under the Eighth 
Amendment. See id. §§ 6.11(A)(h), 305.6 cmt. In addition, Graham focuses on rehabilitation 
in assessing release suitability, whereas under the MPC the judge considers whether a lesser 
sentence would better serve the overall “purposes of sentencing.” Compare Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30 (2010), with MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 305.6(4). 
 364. See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and 
Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 156–60 (2012).  
 365. Id. (discussing reluctance of courts to revisit sentences, even when there has been an 
obvious error). 
 366. These states are Oregon, Delaware, and California. 
 367. JASON ZIEDENBERG, IMRAN AHMAD & SHANNON WRIGHT, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH 
JUSTICE, MISGUIDED MEASURES: THE OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF MEASURE 11 ON OREGON’S 
YOUTH 9–10 (2011), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents
/Misguided_Measures_July_2011.pdf. 
 368. OR. REV. STAT. § 420A.203 (2011). 
 369. Id. 
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right to appointed counsel. 370 The prisoner has a right to examine all reports and 
documents submitted to the court and must be given access to records maintained 
by the Oregon Youth Authority and Department of Corrections.371 At the hearing, 
the prisoner “may examine all of the witnesses called by the state, may subpoena 
and call witnesses to testify on the person’s behalf, and may present evidence and 
argument.”372 In considering release, the court must consider various factors 
regarding the prisoner’s background, offense, and efforts at rehabilitation.373 The 
prisoner “has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that [he or 
she] has been rehabilitated and reformed, and if conditionally released . . . , would 
not be a threat to the safety of the victim, the victim’s family or the community . . . 
and . . . would comply with the release conditions.”374 The court must make 
specific findings regarding these matters.375 The prisoner or the state may appeal an 
order entered under the statute.376  
Thus, procedurally, the statute provides a structure for a hearing that gives 
prisoners a meaningful opportunity to present a case for release. Other states can 
look to this Oregon statute in creating similar court-based second-look procedures, 
or in adopting procedures for their parole boards to use. 
The second-look procedure for juvenile offenders recently enacted in Delaware 
also permits prisoners to petition the court for resentencing, as does the new statute 
in California. The Delaware statute specifies no criteria or procedures for the court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 370. Id. § 420A.203(2)(c)–(d), (3)(b), (3)(h)–(i). 
 371. Id. § 420A.203(3)(e)–(f). 
 372. Id. § 420A.203(3)(g). 
 373. These factors are the following:  
(A) The experiences and character of the person before and after commitment 
to the Oregon Youth Authority or the Department of Corrections;  
(B) The person’s juvenile and criminal records;  
(C) The person’s mental, emotional and physical health;  
(D) The gravity of the loss, damage or injury caused or attempted, during or as 
part of the criminal act for which the person was convicted and sentenced;  
(E) The manner in which the person committed the criminal act for which the 
person was convicted and sentenced;  
(F) The person’s efforts, participation and progress in rehabilitation programs 
since the person’s conviction;  
(G) The results of any mental health or substance abuse treatment;  
(H) Whether the person demonstrates accountability and responsibility for past 
and future conduct;  
(I) Whether the person has made and will continue to make restitution to the 
victim and the community;  
(J) Whether the person will comply with and benefit from all conditions that 
will be imposed if the person is conditionally released;  
(K) The safety of the victim, the victim’s family and the community;  
(L) The recommendations of the district attorney, the Oregon Youth Authority 
and the Department of Corrections; and  
(M) Any other relevant factors or circumstances raised by the state, the Oregon 
Youth Authority, the Department of Corrections or the person. 
Id. § 420A.203(4)(b). 
 374. Id. § 420A.203(3)(k).  
 375. See id. § 420A.203(4)(a).  
 376. Id. § 420A.203(6). 
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to use in considering resentencing requests.377 In California, even if the judge grants a 
resentencing request, the judge cannot actually release the prisoner. Rather, the court 
can simply convert the LWOP sentence to a sentence of life with parole eligibility.378 
Thus, California’s new parole release hearing procedures for juveniles must also be 
considered to determine if the scheme complies with the Eighth Amendment.379  
In sum, states amending their laws to comply with Graham and Miller should 
ensure that legislation specifically addresses the procedures that will be used for 
considering release for juvenile offenders. In establishing these procedures, states can 
draw upon procedural models used at parole revocation and psychiatric review board 
hearings. In addition, states can consider court-based models such as Oregon’s 
second-look procedure. 
CONCLUSION  
After Graham and Miller, states are subject to a new constitutional requirement to 
provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for at least some categories of 
juvenile offenders. This requirement encompasses three distinct components: (1) a 
chance of release at a meaningful point in time, (2) a realistic likelihood of release for 
the rehabilitated, and (3) a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  
For the most part, states have responded to Graham and Miller by simply making 
juvenile offenders eligible for parole under existing parole practices. Yet existing 
parole systems were designed for a different purpose and have previously operated 
free from constitutional constraints. In ordinary adult cases, states do not need to 
provide prisoners with a realistic chance of release or a meaningful hearing. Indeed, 
the survey data presented in this Article reveals parole practices in many states that 
impede meaningful consideration of an inmate’s suitability for release. Some states 
may not be able to rely on their existing parole board practices to provide a 
meaningful opportunity for release as the Eighth Amendment requires and may need 
to craft special rules for boards to use when considering release for juvenile offenders 
serving lengthy sentences.  
The scope of the Eighth Amendment’s meaningful opportunity requirement is 
relevant not only in states that have imposed LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders 
in nonhomicide cases or that mandate LWOP for homicide offenses. Rather, even 
states that impose sentences of life with the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders 
must also ensure that their parole processes in fact provide prisoners with a 
meaningful opportunity for release. All states should examine whether their parole 
systems are operating consistently with the new constitutional requirements. 
Graham and Miller also provide an opportunity for states to rethink the manners in 
which their parole boards treat adult offenders. If the legislature (and/or judge or jury) 
has provided a prisoner with the chance for parole, then this chance should be 
meaningful. Providing meaningful hearings for all parole-eligible prisoners will lead 
to more accurate decisions and foster a sense of fairness and legitimacy about the 
parole system.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 377. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.  
 378. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY OF STATE PAROLE PRACTICES 
















How conducted?  
 











Alabama N n/a n/a n/a 
Alaska Y H P, T Y 
Arizona X X X X 
Arkansas Y H P, V Y 
California Y H P Y 
Colorado Y H V, T Y 
Connecticut Y Both P, V, T N 
Delaware Y H P Y 
Florida Y I P N 
Georgia Y I P N 
Hawaii Y H P, V Y 
Idaho Y Both P, V, T N 
Illinois Y H P Y 
Indiana X X X X 
Iowa Y I V Y 
Kansas Y H P, V, T Y 
Kentucky Y H P, V Y 
Louisiana Y H V Y 
Maine X X X X 
Maryland Y H P, V N 
Massachusetts Y Both P N 
Michigan Y I V Y 
Minnesota Y H V Y 
Mississippi X X X X 
Missouri Y H P, T N 
Montana Y H P, T Y 
Nebraska Y H P Y 
Nevada Y H P, V N 
New Hampshire Y H P, V Y 
New Jersey Y H P, V N 
New Mexico Y H P, V Y 
New York Y H V Y 
North Carolina N n/a n/a n/a 
North Dakota Y H P, V, T Y 
Ohio Y H V Y 
Oklahoma X X X X 
Oregon Y H P, V, T Y 
Pennsylvania Y I P, V N 
Rhode Island Y H P, V, T Y 
South Carolina Y H V Y 
South Dakota Y H P, V Y 
Tennessee Y H P, V N 
Texas Y I P N 
Utah Y H P, V N 
Vermont Y H P, V, T Y 
Virginia Y I P, V, T N 
Washington Y H P, V Y 
West Virginia Y I P, V Y 
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Alabama Y Y n/a N 
Alaska Y Y Y N 
Arizona X X X X 
Arkansas Y Y Y N 
California Y Y Y Y 
Colorado N n/a Y Y 
Connecticut N n/a Y N 
Delaware Y Y Y N 
Florida Y Y N N 
Georgia Y Y N N 
Hawaii Y Y Y Y 
Idaho Y Y Y N 
Illinois Y Y Y N 
Indiana X X X X 
Iowa N n/a Y N 
Kansas Y Y Y N 
Kentucky Y N N N 
Louisiana Y Y Y N 
Maine X X X X 
Maryland Y Y N N 
Massachusetts Y Y Depends Y 
Michigan N n/a N N 
Minnesota Y Y Y N 
Mississippi X X X X 
Missouri Y Y Y N 
Montana Y Y Y Y 
Nebraska Y Y Y N 
Nevada Y Y Y N 
New Hampshire Y Y Y N 
New Jersey Y N N Y 
New Mexico N N N N 
New York Y N N N 
North Carolina Y N n/a N 
North Dakota Y Y Y N 
Ohio Y Y N Y 
Oklahoma X X X X 
Oregon Y Y Y Y 
Pennsylvania Y N N N 
Rhode Island Y Y Y N 
South Carolina Y Y Y N 
South Dakota Y Y Y N 
Tennessee Y Y Y Y 
Texas Y Y N N 
Utah Y N Y N 
Vermont N n/a N N 
Virginia Y Y N N 
Washington Y Y Y Y 
West Virginia Y Y Y N 
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Can attorney present 
mental health expert 
testimony? 
 
Can attorney present 
other witness testimony 
or statements? 
 
Can attorney present 




Alabama Y Y Y 
Alaska Y  — Y 
Arizona X X X 
Arkansas Y Y Y 
California Y N Y 
Colorado N N N 
Connecticut N N Y 
Delaware Y Y Y 
Florida Y Y Y 
Georgia N N Y 
Hawaii Y Y Y 
Idaho Y Y Y 
Illinois Y Y Y 
Indiana X X X 
Iowa N N N 
Kansas Y Y Y 
Kentucky N N N 
Louisiana Y Y Y 
Maine X X X 
Maryland N N Y 
Massachusetts Depends Depends Y 
Michigan N N N 
Minnesota N N N 
Mississippi X X X 
Missouri N N Y 
Montana Y Y Y 
Nebraska Y Y Y 
Nevada Y Y Y 
New Hampshire Y Y Y 
New Jersey N N Y 
New Mexico N N N 
New York N N Y 
North Carolina N N Y 
North Dakota Y Y Y 
Ohio N N Y 
Oklahoma X X X 
Oregon Y Y Y 
Pennsylvania N N Y 
Rhode Island Y Y Y 
South Carolina Y N Y 
South Dakota Y Y Y 
Tennessee Y Y Y 
Texas N N Y 
Utah Y N Y 
Vermont N N N 
Virginia N N N 
Washington N N Y 
West Virginia N N N 
Wisconsin N N N 
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Alabama Y Y Y 
Alaska Y Y N 
Arizona X X X 
Arkansas Y Y Y 
California Y Y Y 
Colorado Y Y N 
Connecticut Y Y N 
Delaware Y Y Y 
Florida Y Y Y 
Georgia Y N N 
Hawaii Y Y Y 
Idaho Y Y Y 
Illinois Y Y Y 
Indiana X X X 
Iowa Y N N 
Kansas Y Y N 
Kentucky Y Y N 
Louisiana Y Y Y 
Maine X X X 
Maryland Y Y N 
Massachusetts Y Y Depends 
Michigan Y N N 
Minnesota Y N N 
Mississippi X X X 
Missouri Y Y Y 
Montana Y Y Y 
Nebraska Y Y Y 
Nevada Y N N 
New Hampshire Y Y Y 
New Jersey Y N N 
New Mexico N N N 
New York Y N N 
North Carolina Y N N 
North Dakota Y Y Y 
Ohio Y Y N 
Oklahoma X X X 
Oregon Y Y N 
Pennsylvania Y N N 
Rhode Island Y Y N 
South Carolina Y Y N 
South Dakota Y Y Y 
Tennessee Y Y Y 
Texas Y N N 
Utah Y N N 
Vermont Y Y N 
Virginia Y Y N 
Washington Y N N 
West Virginia Y Y N 
Wisconsin Y N N 
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Input from victim considered? 
 
In-person input from victim? 
 
  
Alabama Y Y 
Alaska Y Y 
Arizona X X 
Arkansas Y Y 
California Y Y 
Colorado Y Y 
Connecticut Y Y 
Delaware Y Y 
Florida Y Y 
Georgia Y Y 
Hawaii Y Y 
Idaho Y Y 
Illinois Y Y 
Indiana X X 
Iowa Y Y 
Kansas Y Y 
Kentucky Y Y 
Louisiana Y Y 
Maine X X 
Maryland Y Y 
Massachusetts Y Y 
Michigan Y Y 
Minnesota Y Y 
Mississippi X X 
Missouri Y Y 
Montana Y Y 
Nebraska Y Y 
Nevada Y Y 
New Hampshire Y Y 
New Jersey Y Y 
New Mexico Y Y 
New York Y Y 
North Carolina Y Y 
North Dakota Y Y 
Ohio Y Y 
Oklahoma X X 
Oregon Y Y 
Pennsylvania Y N 
Rhode Island Y Y 
South Carolina Y Y 
South Dakota Y Y 
Tennessee Y Y 
Texas Y Y 
Utah Y Y 
Vermont Y Y 
Virginia Y Y 
Washington Y Y 
West Virginia Y Y 
Wisconsin Y Y 
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Alabama Y Board Y Y 
Alaska Y DOC N n/a 
Arizona X X X X 
Arkansas Y DOC Y Y 
California Y DOC Y N 
Colorado Y DOC Y Y 
Connecticut Y Board Y N 
Delaware Y Both Y Y 
Florida Y Both Y Y 
Georgia Y Board Y N 
Hawaii Y DOC Y Y 
Idaho Y Board Y Y 
Illinois Y Both Y Y 
Indiana X X X X 
Iowa Y DOC Y N 
Kansas Y Board Y Y 
Kentucky Y DOC Y Y 
Louisiana Y DOC Y Y 
Maine X X X X 
Maryland Y Board Y Y 
Massachusetts Y Both Y Depends 
Michigan Y DOC Y Y 
Minnesota Y DOC Y N 
Mississippi X X X X 
Missouri Y Both Y Y 
Montana Y Both Y Y 
Nebraska Y Both Y Y 
Nevada Y DOC Y Y 
New Hampshire Y DOC Y Y 
New Jersey Y Board Y N 
New Mexico N n/a N N 
New York Y DOC Y N 
North Carolina Y Board Y Y 
North Dakota Y DOC Y Y 
Ohio Y Both Y Y 
Oklahoma X X X X 
Oregon Depends Both Y Y 
Pennsylvania Y Board Y N 
Rhode Island Y DOC Y N 
South Carolina Y Board Y Y 
South Dakota Y DOC Y Y 
Tennessee Y Both Y Y 
Texas Y Board Y N 
Utah Y DOC Y N 
Vermont Y DOC Y Y 
Virginia Y Both Y Y 
Washington Y Board Y N 
West Virginia Y DOC Y Y 
Wisconsin Y DOC Y N 
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Table 7. Prisoner access to information 
 
 
Access to prosecutor 
input? 
 
Access to victim input? 
 
Access to mental 
health evaluation? 




Alabama N N n/a 
Alaska Y Y n/a 
Arizona X X X 
Arkansas Y Limited n/a 
California Y — Y 
Colorado N N n/a 
Connecticut Y Y Y 
Delaware N N N 
Florida Limited Limited n/a 
Georgia N N N 
Hawaii Y Y Y 
Idaho N N n/a 
Illinois Limited N n/a 
Indiana X X X 
Iowa N N n/a 
Kansas N N n/a 
Kentucky Limited Limited n/a 
Louisiana N N n/a 
Maine X X X 
Maryland Limited N N 
Massachusetts Y Some cases n/a 
Michigan Y N Y 
Minnesota Limited With consent Y 
Mississippi X X X 
Missouri Y N n/a 
Montana Y — N 
Nebraska N N n/a 
Nevada Limited With consent n/a 
New Hampshire Y Y n/a 
New Jersey Limited N N 
New Mexico N N n/a 
New York N N N 
North Carolina N N N 
North Dakota Limited N n/a 
Ohio Limited N N 
Oklahoma X X X 
Oregon Y Y Y 
Pennsylvania N N N 
Rhode Island With consent With consent N 
South Carolina Y Limited N 
South Dakota Y Limited n/a 
Tennessee Limited N N 
Texas N N n/a 
Utah Y Y Y 
Vermont Y Limited Y 
Virginia N N n/a 
Washington Y Limited Y 
West Virginia N Limited n/a 
Wisconsin Limited N — 
Wyoming n/a N Y 
  
 
 
 
 
 
